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Abstract
Architectural theory often overlooks the fact that it must, whether
explicitly or not, situate itself within a range of attitudes toward
knowledge and meaning. This essay will focus in particular on the
theory and ideology of Peter Eisenman. I have chosen Eisenman in part
because his work provides an illustration of the way in which
ideological decisions play a role in the location of theories of
architecture within a spectrum of attitudes toward epistemology and
meaning; and in part because criticism of the manifest failings of
Eisenman's view may point to criticism of many traditional architectural
attitudes.
The implications of the epistemology and the account of meaning
adopted by an architectural theory are enormous. The epistemological
attitudes a theory adopts are manifested in the definition of its own
rationale - that is, in its account of the relative dependence or
independence of architecture from history, in whether it sees archi-
tectural "progress" resulting from a set of internal, formal rules or
from external, social pressure, and in whether it regards the relation-
ship of the conceptual to the physical as being located in the mind's
unchanging ability to structure the world or in societal use of changing
conventions to organize reality. Similarly, the attitude a theory of
architecture adopts towards meaning is revealed by whether it finds
meaning produced by the correspondence between the mind's cognitive
structures and their physical manifestations or by the conventions
linking socioculturally determined values with their physical tokens.
To understand architecture theory in this context, I have
investigated a range of epistemological and linguistic theories. In
particular, this essay will focus upon accounts of knowledge and of
language which originate with the collapse of inductivism. In the
epistemological sphere, the failure of an inductive rationale for
knowledge undermined the view of knowledge as "objective", of the
pursuit of knowledge of the physical world as an autonomous enterprise,
in which the correspondence of scientific facts with reality was
distorted only by inaccuracy of technique and the like. Instead, these
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post-inductive epistemologies focus increasingly on the social nature
of knowledge and on science as a cultural artifact; "true" scientific
accounts are seen increasingly as reflections on a society's meta-
physical biases, and "knowledge" increasingly as the expression of
social convention. Just as the sociocultural becomes the distorting
lens obscuring our "objective" view of reality, so too, for linguistics,
the crisis appears as the breakdown of the unsullied correspondence
between world/language/mind. No longer a value-free code for mental
"pictures" of real objects, language becomes itself a system with its
own laws which organizes reality, and meaning a mechanism of that system
rather than the correspondence of word to thing.
The almost-intuitive reasonableness of these analogies is hardly
accidental: in fact, they are hardly mere analogies. As I have argued,
it is not possible to discuss architecture and architecture theory
without giving an account, however implicit, of its epistemological
status on the one hand and of its capacities for, and mechanisms of,
meaning on the other, It is, then, no surprise to discover that
architecture finds cousins in science, the usual subject of epistemo-
logical research, and in language, the usual realm of theories of
meaning. The point of architectural theory is to account for the
relationship of architecture to its history, to its social context, to
its stated program, and to its conceptual and perceptual focus - and this
is true even for a theory that admits of no such relationships. It is
hoped that realization of these inherent positions of architectural
theory will make theory more aware of the breadth of its implications.
For this, the case of Peter Eisenman should prove instructive.
Thesis Supervisor: Stanford Anderson
Title: Professor of History and
Architecture
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Introduction
Architectural theory often overlooks the fact that it must, whether
explicitly or not, situate itself within a range of attitudes toward
knowledge and meaning. This essay will focus in particular on the theory
and ideology of Peter Eisenman. I have chosen Eisenman in part because
his work provides an illustration of the way in which ideological
decisions play a role in the location of theories of architecture within
a spectrum of attitudes toward epistemology and meaning; and in part
because criticism of the manifest failings of Eisenman's view may point
to criticism of many traditional architectural attitudes.
The implications of epistemology and the account of meaning adopted
by an architectural theory are enormous. The epistemological attitudes
a theory adopts are manifested in the definition of its own rationale
,it supports - that is, in its account of the relative dependence or
independence of architecture from history, in whether it sees architec-
tural "progress" resulting from a set of internal, formal rules or from
external, social pressure, and in whether it finds the relationship of
the conceptual to the physical as located in the mind's unchanging
ability to structure the world or in societal use of changing conventions
to organize reality. Similarly, the attitude a theory of architecture
adopts towards meaning is revealed by whether it finds meaning produced
by the correspondence between the mind's cognitive structures and their
physical manifestations or by the conventions linking socioculturally
determined values with their physical tokens.
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To understand this view of architectural theory I have investigated
a range of epistemological and linguistic theories. In particular, this
essay will focus upon accounts of knowledge and of language which
originate with the collapse of inductivism. In the epistemological
sphere, the failure of an inductive rationale for knowledge undermined
the view of knowledge as "objective", of the pursuit of knowledge of the
physical world as an autonomous enterprise, in which the correspondence
of scientific facts with reality was distorted only by inaccuracy of
technique and the like. Instead, these post-inductive epistemologies
focus increasingly on the social nature of knowledge and on science as
a cultural artifact; "true" scientific accounts are seen increasingly as
reflections of a society's metaphsyical biases, and "knowledge"
increasingly as the expression of social convention. Just as the
sociocultural becomes the distorting lens obscuring our "objective" view
of reality, so too, for linguistics, the crisis appears as the breakdown
of the unsullied correspondence between world/language/mind. No longer
a value-free code for mental "pictures" of real objects, language
becomes itself a system with its own laws which organize reality, and
meaning a mechanism of that system rather than the correspondence of
word to thing.
Even on this sketchy account of post-inductive theories of knowledge
and language it should be clear why they play such a crucial role in
architectural theory. It is more than a process of analogy between
architecture and science on the one hand, language on the other, although,
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in fact, such analogies are suggestive and frequently sustained. The
categories, terminology, and procedures of epistemology and of
linguistics are often applied to architectural discussion precisely
because of the persuasiveness of these analogies. (Indeed, Eisenman
makes, as we shall see, an explicit analogy to language the basis of
his theory.) Architecture bears no striking resemblance to science as
it is described by theorists of knowledge: it has a complex of social,
cultural, technological, and other components; it has both internal and
societal criteria for problem-solving. More importantly, as a
fundamental social institution, it has, much like science, been subject
to a great deal of conscious theorizing, concerning its methodology,
objectives, and legitimacy. These attitudes, to science as to
architecture, have been uniformly permeated with our implicit supposi-
tions concerning the physical world and "true" knowledge of it.
Similarly, the view of "architecture-as-language" has a suggestive ring:
On this model, architecture as a "language" can be analyzed using the
categories of linguistic theory, since it exhibits parallel phenomena,
and serves parallel functions, to those of language. It has both
conceptual and physical characteristics; it has a certain structure
relating elements in a particular way; and it takes on both communicative
and utilitarian functions.
The almost-intuitive reasonableness of these analogies is hardly
accidental: in fact, they are hardly mere analogies. As I have argued,
it is not possible to discuss architecture without giving an account,
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however implicit, of its epistemological status on the one hand and of
its capacities for, and mechanisms of, meaning on the other. It is,
then, no surprise to discover that architecture finds cousins in science,
the usual subject of epistemological research, and in language, the usual
realm of theories of meaning. The point of architectural theory is to
account for the relationship of architecture to its history, to its
social context, to its stated program, and to its conceptual and
perceptual focus - and this is true even for a theory that admits of no
such relationships. It is hoped that realization of these inherent
positions of architectural theory will make theory more aware of the
breadth of its implications. For this, the case of Peter Eisenman should
prove instructive.
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This section will examine the implications of post-inductive
epistemologies, and I will begin by examining the conflict between rival
epistemological research programs, each having as its hard core
alternative views of the autonomy of rationality, of science, and of the
growth of knowledge; that is, alternative views on the demarcation
between external and internal history in Lakatos' formulation, and a
different priority in the hierarchy of images of knowledge in Elkana's
terms.
I will first briefly describe the various research programs of
Lakatos and of his predecessors. These views, of which Lakatos is the
last proponent, are designed to maintain empirical foundations for
rationalism, and to save rationalism and intellectual honesty from the
sceptics, and the sociologists. We will examine Lakatos' more flexible
and relativistic approach to the growth of knowledge, and, in particular,
his attitudes towards the role of history in testing theories of knowledge,
his concept that theoretical growth and empiricalness must be linked,
and that theoretical growth must precede empirical growth; and the
impact of Lakatos' allowing of appeals against factual evidence, which
leaves any research program immune not only from instant dismissal, but
from any final refutation as well.
In particular, we will compare the role of conventional judgements
in all these programs, and the associated problems of demarcating between
- 6 -
internal and external history. We will then examine Feyerabend's
contention that Lakatos' view has so loosened scientific standards that
its implications can only be methodological anarchy, and that this can
only be beneficial. In particular, we will examine Feyerabend's claim
that (i) Lakatos' conventionalism internal to science depends nonetheless
on external factors to explain the growth of knowledge; and that (ii)
his concept of the continually expanding empirical content of theories is
not a meaningful one (particularly in the case of mature research
programs), since their contents cannot be commensurable.
More critically, we will examine the hard core of Feyerabend's
approach: that these theories constitute alternative forms of life, such
that their grammars are untranslatable because they contain incommensu-
rable cosmologies, and that not only is the attempt to reduce their
diversity to single, well-understood logic futile, it is also positively
harmful. Such an approach would preclude understanding the forms of life
themselves; this can only be achieved through 'anthropological' fieldwork
to see how scientists actually progress, and produce knowledge, and it is
a process directly analogous to myth-making. It similarly precludes
attempting the major goal of Feyerabend's thought, which is to understand
the nature of incommensurability itself, in order to proliferate
alternative world views and forms of life, and in particular, an
alternative to the Western, scientific view with its bias towards
standards of rationality and towards recourse to empirical justification.
This requires nothing less than a new language to describe these "complex
- 7
historico-anthropological phenomena, which must be invented, through a
long, and as yet very incomplete process."
We can then reinterpret Feyerabend's "anarchism" in the light of
his extremely consistent drive towards the realization of this research
program. Just as Gallileo, while trying to establish his new world view
and supersede the Aristotelian form of life (not disprove it, of course),
had to rely on the production of enough "nonsense" to produce a
sufficiently articulated new language of his own, so Feyerabend, in
superseding the rationalist idealist program, which naturally works
considerably better than his at the moment, must adopt an anarchism
independent of all previous systems, until he invents the elements and
learns his new language. In the meantime, he must also deluge his
opponents with propaganda, to make "the illiterate logicians" of the
scientific establishment take note, and alert the community at large to
the birth of a new world view.
We will then examine Y. Elkana's research program, representing a
positive problem shift from Lakatos', and reinterpret Lakatos and,
particularly, Feyerabend, in its light. Elkana firmly embraces an
anthropology of rationalities, and is convinced that any standards of
knowledge (whether methodological or otherwise) are culture bound. He
argues, like Lakatos, that knowledge grows by a continuous dialogue
between competing total world views, scientific research programs, but
only within a culturally established framework. The body of knowledge
(methods, solutions, problems, metaphysical hard core...) will interact
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with socially determined images of knowledge (the task of science,
nature of truth, sources of knowledge, methodologies...) and with socially
determined values and norms (political ideologies, social pressures, and
their relation to the support of institutions or research programs), and,
at any given time, these are not distinguishable.
Following Feyerabend, Elkana aims at a multifaceted, "thick,"
"hermeneutic" description of science, and its changes, in Western
society. However, he assumes that the changing interactions and
conflicts between various research programs form a continuum and are
commensurable. This is a critical premise. An account of the nature of
the differences between research programs, or how world views are
constituted, or what they are, is not attempted, and is probably not
possible within this frame. Elkana's approach is purely descriptive, and
though aimed at understanding, will not produce explanations of the
causes of these phenomena.
The current philosophical interest in the problems of maintaining
even the semblance of a rational basis for science, and in defining the
limits and criteria for rationality, is the direct consequence of the
collapse of inductivism -- the theory that, on the basis of objectively
determined facts, universally true theories can be abstracted.
The only scientific statements accepted by the inductivist are
these infallible inductive generalizations. Consequently, intellectual
integrity depends on limiting oneself to proven statements - that is,
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statements of observational fact or direct extrapolations from such
facts. Because they recognized that statements of "fact" could be true,
inductivists felt that a universal theory could be disproved by a hard
fact. When this happened, there was no alternative but to abandon it.1
In inductivism, no element of conventionalism is involved: facts
may be observed without difficulty, and universal inductive laws apply.
The scientific community, and society at large, can only rely on these
principles and apply them; they have no further input, and in this sense,
scientific knowledge is entirely independent of those who gather it.
The success of science is seen as the result of the consistent
application of these principles.
A rationalistic, inductivist, historian wishing to explain the
rational development of science will look for the uncovering of factual
evidence and its subsequent generalization, according to universal
inductive principles, into universal laws. Theories are excluded from
2
rational history and branded pseudo- or pre-scientific, if it can be
demonstrated that they do not follow this pattern. Nor can an
inductivist historian explain why some facts and not others are chosen
by the science of a given era, for this depends on external explanation
.3
and is thus somehow "accidental" to science.
On this inductivist model of the "scientific method," science pro-
gresses linearly. Knowledge grows as more and more facts are unearthed,
and are subsumed under progressively more powerful, more highly-
generalized theories. The relation between fact and theory is seen as
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unproblematic, and the accessibility of "pure fact" (strict
observation, free from conceptualization) is assumed. Note, then, that
each theory, while expanding on the empirical content of its
predecessor(s), will thereby still contain all that earlier theories
contained, and generate precisely the same set of "facts" (in addition
of course, to those novel facts it accounts for). For this reason, the
commensurability of successive or competing theories is simply never a
problem. The new is seen as "the old, plus" and it is assumed that
throughout theoretical change and conflict we are still talking about the
same thing.
Hume first exposed the impossibility of inferring universal laws
from specific facts and Popper was the first contemporary philosopher to
face this fact, and to propose his own solution to the problem of science
and rationality in the face of it.
"the advance of science is not due to the fact that more and more
perceptual experiences accumulate in the course of time. Nor is
it du& to the fact that we are making better use of our senses.
Out of uninterpreted experiences science cannot be distilled, no
matter how industriously we gather and sort them. Bold ideas,
unjustified anticipation, and speculative thought are our only
means of interpreting nature.... And we must hazard them to win
our prize. Those of us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to
the hazard of refutation do not take part in the scientific game."
Faced with the impossibility of ever proving theories in the
traditional model, several alternatives have been proposed, giving
different weight to the role and finality, of empirical refutation.
The first theory of this type, "naturalistic falsificationism"5 in
Lakatos' terminology represents a major retreat from earlier theories
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of rationality, since all theories are now considered fallible, but an
empirical basis for science is still maintained, dogmatically, by
arguing that empirical counterevidence, and only empirical counter-
evidence, can disprove a theory, although empirical evidence cannot
establish any theory. The universal inductive logic has been abandoned,
but the possibility of establishing hard facts has been maintained,
based on the belief that it is possible to distinguish between theories,
which are speculative, and observations, which are not. It is also
maintained that once a proposition is established by observation, it is
true, proven from the facts. In order to be rational one must now only
propose disprovable fallible theories (others are 'un-scientific'), which
must therefore exclude certain facts. Falsificationists must therefore
specify the conditions for abandoning their theory, if they are in
contradiction with these facts.6
However, it is not possible to demarcate between observation and
theory, since all observations depend on an initial bias on the part of
the observer when he selects the information out of the infinity of
'facts' he might choose; and it is logically impossible to prove
propositions with facts.
Furthermore, the standard requiring that all theories specify what
facts would disprove them excludes the most widely respected theories
since (i) probability-based theories, such as Newton's dynamics, work
only if certain initial conditions are satisfied, and only under certain
conditions. They cannot exclude anything, since any occurrence not
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predicted by the theory can always be explained by a new subsidiaiy
theory, explaining and predicting factors that might have distorted the
observations. Indeed, some of Newton's greatest triumphs occurred when
observational refutations were explained, and confirmed the theory all
the more.
Theories, then, contrary to the fallibilist view, are neither
provable or disprovable; they have probability zero, and do not set any
conditions under which they might be abandoned.8
So rationalism has to retreat again and set less ambitious
standards to defend its empirical hard-core against its sceptical
detractors, and to establish new standards for intellectual honesty.
Some way must be found to prefer some theories over others, and to ensure
scientific progress. A number of theories have been proposed. They are
characterized by their conventionalism, and by their delegation of the
decision as to the status of theories to the (temporary) consensus of
the scientific community. Conventionalists allow that science is an
activity that builds "systems of pigeonholes" to organize facts into
some coherent whole. It is decided, by convention, which systems to
adopt, and to keep them intact as long as possible. They are not true -
in the old-fashioned, absolutist, universal sense - but only "true by
convention."9
Lakatos distinguished two kinds of conventionalism. Conservative
conventionalists (who contend that we are trapped since once a pigeon-
hole system is dubbed "the true," and systems of auxiliary hypotheses
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built to protect it, the refuting power of "empirical" evidence
decreases); and revolutionary conventionalists (who contend that
systems must sometimes be overthrown when they become too constricting).
For revolutionary conventionalists, progress is still possible, and
consists in the succession of new, simpler frameworks.1 0
A conventionalist will look for instances of cumbersome frameworks
being overturned by simpler ones (Ptolemy/Copernicus). Conventionalism
cannot explain why some facts rather than others are chosen for a
particular pigeon-hole system, or why some rather than other pigeon-
hole systems are adopted. These problems are seen as external, and may
be explained by a variety of social, psychological, and other means.11
It is clear that, for the conventionalist, to accept rival systems
of theories only because they are "simpler" is to reduce science to an
aesthetic exercise, and does not advance the cause of rationalism very
far. An alternative, which Lakatos calls methodological falsification-
ism, is proposed by Popper, whose theory is that it is not the whole
pigeon-hole system that is coventionally "decided," but only the status
of individual facts as they are brought to light. Instead of distinguish-
ing systems by their simplicity, generality, etc., Popper "decides" only
facts, which are distinguishable by a "generally accepted" technique,
and which can falsify theories.13
So where the fallibilist sees theories disproved by facts, Popper
sees theories disproved by "facts," and realizes that fallible theories
are involved in establishing them. (It is obviously necessary to
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establish boundaries betwen unproblematic background "knowledge" and
"facts," from the theory to be tested. The necessary observation
theories and their associated techniques are deemed unproblematic by
convention and consensus; there is even conventionalism in the degree of
corroboration which potential falsifying facts must have.)14 So in
retaining the demand that a theory be rejected if it is "falsified" even
if this does not mean that it has been disproven (the observation
consensus may be wrong), the falsificationist is taking a daring risk.
But this is the hallmark of the ("naive") falsificationist -- he only
considers a theory "scientific" if it is falsifiable.
It is important to note that (i) probability laws may now be
"scientific" if they specify rejection rules; and (ii) theories that only
function under specified conditions can also be "scientific": if a
theory, along with its conditions, is refuted, it is decided whether this
is a refutation of the theory, or just a violation of the required
conditions. Naturally, there will be severe tests to determine whether
conditions are violated.15 This may be crucial, as one of the many
anomalies that any theory is bound to have may, by convention, be
promoted to a crucial experiment and become the decisive test which may
cause the entire theory to be abandoned -- a procedure which makes many
theories' dismissal imminent.
Clearly, this position is a significant improvement, but are its
prescriptions too firm? More importantly, does it bear any resemblance
to what scientists do? It does not, in three obvious cases:
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(i) scientists are very slow to accept refutation; (ii) tests, rather
than representing a confrontation between a single theory and a new set
of facts, are often confrontations between several theories; and (iii)
not only is the only acceptable or interesting outcome of such a test
not falsification, it is often, in fact, corroboration.
1 6
Popper proposes an alternative, less stringent model: to reduce
the conventionalism inherent in the "naive" approach, he specifies
(i) that to be scientific a theory must have excess empirical content
over its predecessor - it must lead to the discovery of new facts; and
(ii) that auxiliary theories may defend theories against too arbitrary
a dismissal, if they too represent a theoretically progressive problem
shift - that is, if they predict some novel fact, and have excess
empirical content over their predecessor. Single theories are no longer
evaluated, but series of theories are; and the notions of growth and
empiricalness-are linked. Progress is a function of empirical growth.
1 7
It is clear that no single test alone can lead to falsification; a better
theory must emerge first, and it is only better if it predicts new facts.
Nor is it single theories that are falsified, or pseudo-scientific,
but sequences of theories, with their (progressive or not) auxiliary
theories, to explain anomalies, and their observation theories.
Lakatos now proposes his contribution to this progressing
epistemological research program. It is a methodology for scientific
research programs18 (hereafter, MSRP) which are evaluated in terms of
progressive problem shifts (successive theories producing increased
- 16 -
empirical content) or degenerating problem shifts. Each program has
its own set of rules as to which problems should be addressed
(positive heuristic) and which ignored (negative heuristic). 1 9
Each research program has as its hard core a set of metaphysical/
conventional positions (e.g., the Cartesian metaphysic that the universe
is a huge clockwork device) which will not be questioned (for the time
being). They will be defended by the use of (progressive) auxiliary
hypotheses that will form a protective belt around the core. If the
protective belt cannot consistently produce novel facts then the hard
core may have to be abandoned.20 It is critical to note that it is
immediately clear if hypotheses are theoretically content-increasing,
although developing empirical evidence may take much longer. In other
words, all that is necessary in order to stick to a program in the face
of refutations, is the possibility of new empirical evidence, hopefully
at regular intervals.21
Each program also has a- positive heuristic, which will dictate, to
a large extent, the problems that the researchers will emphasize. So
long as their program is progressing they will not pay too much
attention to the many cases that their theories cannot yet account for.
This heuristic will be a set of more and more comprehensive simulations
22
of reality (according to the dictates of the hard core). It will
usually be obvious, in an early part of the research program, that parts
of the theory are patently wrong or represent only the crudest
approximations. It will be no surprise to the scientist that they will
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not correspond to the available data. He will not be interested, until
his program is more fully developed. 2 3
The positive heuristic may also be seen as a metaphysical principle,
but a fairly flexible one since creative shifts in the positive
heuristic may give a failing program a new impetus.2 4
This positive heuristic is the main explanation for the comparative
autonomy of science, its relative independence from outside interference
in the conduct of its affairs. What is external for Popper has become
internal for Lakatos. 2 5
Several crucial differences should be noticed between Lakatos'
research program and Popper's theories. There is no instant
falsification any longer - Popper's great negative experiments disappear;
"crucial experiment is an honorific title,"2 6 conferred only long after
the event, and may even be withdrawn. Any theory, even a false one,
may be defended progressively for a long time and still be "rational."
There is no instant rationality either, since at any given time it may
be difficult to tell which research program has the upper hand, and any
program, no matter how badly it is doing, may stage a comeback.27
However, the exact conditions of the various theories must be made public
at all times.28 It is therefore perfectly rational to stick to a program
for however long one chooses, despite counter-evidence; ultimately, the
academic community will intervene, and stop funding the program or
teaching its results. This is natural, and, for Lakatos, quite
acceptable.29 There are, however, no internal rules for the research
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foundation or the editor, when they accept or reject a program or a
paper - this is a matter of "common sense." But it is common sense in
a much more restricted framework than that of the conventionalist who
decides between a simple or complex pigeon-hole system, or the Popperian
who has to decide where to demarcate between problematic and un-
problematic knowledge.3 0
The MSRP, naturally, is also a historiography. Rather than look
for revolutions, crucial experiments, and the like, the historian will
look for progressive problem shifts.31 It will also be supplemented by
an external history (to explain, for example, why certain disciplines
emerge or disappear in a certain time and place). One of Lakatos' main
points is that the external influences of the fallibilists or of the
methodological falsificationists have been transferred to internal history.
Most importantly, irrefutable metaphysics, which are external to all
previous epistemologies, is now an integral part of science and of its
reconstruction.3 2 Each theory of rationality, with its own definitions
of internal and external, produces its own interpretation of the history
of science. Each interpretation will need its own empirical external
theory to explain the "non-rational" parts of history. But Lakatos
argues that internal history, "the rational aspect of scientific growth,
is completely explained by one's logic of scientific discovery."33 The
corollary to this is, clearly, that history depends on one's theory of
scientific knowledge and of its growth; our observation of history is
theory-laden, just as our observation of natural phenomena is.
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The reconstruction of internal history, the rational part of history
(according to our rationality theory) is firmly in World 3 - it is a
disembodied version of scientific growth, in which the scientists'
opinions, moods, status, is quite irrelevant, or at best a problem to be
delegated to an external supplementary theory. Indeed, it is not
accurate or relevant to say that there was, for example, a Proutian
program. There is only the historian's reconstruction, which may even
be substantially more complete than the "original." 3 5
The stage is now set for Lakatos' theory for testing conventionalist
epistemologies. Lakatos proposes that "as all methodologies function as
historiographical (meta-historical) theories (or research programs)....
(they) can be criticized by criticising the rational historical
reconstructions to which they lead."3 6  In other words, competing
historiographic research programs can be tested against the facts of
history, just as competing scientific research programs can, and they
will be assessed the same way: according to whether or not they are
progressing.
Rationality, then, is conventional. Theories of rationality, driven
by their own metaphysical hard cores, will compete just as other theories
do. If they progress they will pursue the process of predicting new
historical facts, and will explain more historical facts as internal.
Naturally no theory will be able to explain them all, and this dis-
crepancy will be remedied over time either by other historiographical
research programs or by a progressive problem shift in the original
- 20 -
program. If it appears that the rational hard cores of these
historiographic programs can only be defended by relying increasingly
on external explanations, then this would be a clear sign, for a
rationalist historian, that these historiographies are degenerating and
that more original and innovative alternatives are needed.
At this point it is useful to review the extent to which Lakatos'
MSRPs conventionalism is determined by decisions and beliefs of the
scientist involved, and the extent to which the actual development of
science, as well as its reconstruction, is dependent on external value
judgements.
(i) The theory of rationality, just like any other research program, is
subject to improvement, change, and replacement by a better theory. The
choice of Lakatos' hard core and those of the alternative theories is a
matter that can only be explained externally.
(ii) To decide whether a research program is to be abandoned, whether
it is only temporarily degenerating, or progressing enough and in the
right direction, requires consensus on the part of the scientific
community via its journals, research funds, etc.
(iii) The choice of problems, the choice of hard core for a research
program, the choice of positive heuristic, require decisions by the
scientist, which will be partially influenced by (ii).
It is primarily on the grounds that these three categories of value
judgement will undermine Lakatos' "autonomy of science" that Feyerabend
is critical of the MSRP.3 7
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Although approving of Lakatos' granting of a "breathing space" to
research programs despite inconsistency, lack of empirical content, etc.,
and despite Lakatos' accepting that a method's standards are not beyond
criticism, which naturally Feyerabend feels are major improvements over
previous dogmas, he argues that Lakatos' method describes standards, and
not what to do or how to act on them; therefore, it not only relies on
external factors to give it any teeth and to explain the growth of
knowledge, but it also depends on basic, culturally-determined value
judgements to determine what science is and how it changes.
Lakatos' argument rests on two major points:
(i) that science is rational, and that its rationality can be
tested against historical facts, but is independent of them.
"Progress in a theory of scientific rationality is assessed by its
discovery of new historical facts, and by the reconstruction of a growing.
bulk of value-impregnated history as rational. 39 This is the historio-
graphical analogue to the scientist's progress being judged by the
success of his positive heuristic, as Lakatos defines it.
However, according to Feyerabend, the basic facts of history which
Lakatos assesses are themselves value judgements on behalf of the
scientific community. They strictly define what is to be included. (They
do not, for example, rate very highly the medieval, or the non-western.)
If, then, Lakatos' history and therefore his historiographic testing has
been contaminated, Feyerabend wants to know what hidden assumptions
Lakatos is making about the nature of science. Is he just pushing his
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own "conservative" bias in the disguise of rationality, when many other
alternatives exist? Is Lakatos doing such violence to real history, by
reconstructing it in the light of his preconceptions about what science
is, that crucial part of science, the aspects that are essential for its
survival, are being overlooked? (Feyerabend will define these as
illogicality, subterfuge, anarchy...)40
Whether explicit or implicit, there will be basic metaphysical value
judgements at the hard core of Lakatos' position, and of his historio-
graphy, and of the MSRP, which may conflict with those of other research
programs, say that of a medicine man. How then will it be possible to
judge their respectiye epistemologies?41 1
Is it even possible to judge whether, if a science must progress
according to its own internal laws only, Aristotelians were any less
rational than the followers of Galileo? They too had managed to
accomodate many facts without changing their basic principles, thus
maintaining their own standard of stability.4 2
The medicine man too "has a complex set of rules and compares his
results and tricks with those of other medicine men. He has a rich and
coherent professional ideology."43 Yet he is not taken seriously. How
is science superior when both it and the medicine man "produce results
that conform to their standards and other results that do not conform to
their standards?"44 For what reason does the medicine man fail to fit
into Western images of science and standards of scientific conduct?
As Lakatos' hard core rationalist metaphysics, and his choice of
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historical data for his historiographic theory will be at variance with
other epistemologies with different hard cores and totally different
concepts of sources of legitimate information, Feyerabend argues that
Lakatos' independent standards are both compromised and useless.
(ii) that the autonomy of science is guaranteed by the internal
generation of positive heuristics.
At the level of the practicing scientist, since there is no rational
way to abandon a program, since it is always capable of resurgence,
given sufficient imagination in the formulation of progressing problem
shifts, not only is nothing excluded, but, in order not to reduce science
to mere proliferation, social judgements (on the part of the scientific
community) must intervene at regular intervals to cut off unproductive
programs.
What is more important is that there is, according to Feyerabend,
very little consensus at the time, while a scientist is working, to help
him decide what (if anything) is a positive problem shift, and what is
just the amassing of useless information.45
So basic value judgements must be used here too -- value judgements
that depend on social consensus and that are rarely made for any good
reason.
Even empirical growth is value-laden, because not any empirical
growth will do. Hence for Feyerabend, "anything goes." That is, it is
precisely this kind of contrast between the standards Lakatos proposes
for the MSRP and the actual process of choice and decision in science
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that leads Feyerabend to claim that such standards are not only
innaccurate to the description of science, but, in fact, would impede
its progress if applied. Pushed far enough, these standards for the
selection, abandonment, and modification of scientific research programs
yield only social and personal value-judgements, firmly embedded in a
culture and a time. For Feyerabend, the credo of "anything goes" -
methodological anarchism - is not only a more accurate statement of the
procedures of the scientific community, but the only guide-line
permitting its continued success as well.
The evidence and techniques which a scientist has at his disposal,
his laws, his experimental results, his epistemological prejudices,
his attitude towards the absurd consequences of the theories he
does accept... never fully separated from the historical background.
The material is always contaminated by principles which he 4 oes
not know, and which, if known, would be very hard to test.
This is the case both for the scientist, and for the epistemologist,
whose own world view must contain their own prejudices about what
information to use and what operations to perform on it. Theory and
observation, internal and external histories or contexts of discovery
and justification are all categorizations that are at least only
temporary, and should under no circumstances be regarded as having any
permanent validity or rationality.
So, to find out how a change occurs, how one research program takes
over from another, the extra-scientific motives behind change must be
analyzed; they largely override all the inadequacies of a new program,
and are entirely external to it.47 This must be the case, since,
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according to Feyerabend, each new research program represents a new
incommensurable world view. Hence, the substitution can only be made as
a result of 'political' change, which is an integral part of the growth
of knowledge. As far as Feyerabend is concerned, there can be no
rational reason for Galileo's success or for the failure of
Aristotelianism, because,
while the pre-Copernican theory was in trouble, the Copernican
theory was in even greater trouble... (being) confronted by even
more drastic refuting instances and implausibilities.
4 8
Galileo's theories were only backed up by other theories, which were
also wrong, and he defended himself against his opponents by clever
rhetoric and the unscrupulous use of ad hoc hypotheses.*
But Feyerabend goes further, to attack the very basis of all
theories of scientific knowledge -- that knowledge grows. He argues
that the foundations of this thesis, that different theories share
similar contents, that they talk about the same things, is nothing more
than an illusion. The difference between Copernican and Aristotelian
systems is a difference between two different forms of life. The grammar
of the commonly accepted Aristotelian idiom is incommensurable with that
* Typical of Galileo's "attitude" is his use of the telescope, to try to
show why the brightness of Mars and of Venus do not correspond to those
predicted by Copernicus' theory. The telescope produces new phenomena,
unsupported by any plausible theory, which provides contradictory
information, and also some information which seems to support Copernicus,
namely that Mars and Venus do look as bright as they should, through the
telescope. There is particularly no explanation of why the telescope
should be effective extraterrestrially. (Aristotelians believed that
terrestrial phenomena were indifferent from those in space.)
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of the Copernicans. Galileo changes
familiar connections between words and words. He introduces new
concepts, words and impressions (he introduces new natural
interpretations). He uses new principles (laws of intertia,
universal relativity of motion) and alters the sensory code of his
observation statements.4 9
Furthermore, it can be seen that Galileo was right - there was no reason
to stick to the Aristotelian form of life, any more than there is a
reason to stick to any form of life.
We can now see why Feyerabend considers any methodological approach
to be so futile -- its assumptions, its goals, its ideas, its prejudices,
the whole system of thought and of perceiving the world in which they are
necessarily embedded, must be alien to those they are examining. So not
only are all the factors which Lakatos argues are internal to science an
integral part of an external form of life, so that, within a form of
life (or a major scientific or historiographic research program) every-
thing is conventional and everything has an external element, but there
is no way of comparing alternative ways of life, since one can only be
held against the terms of reference of the other, and these terms of
reference undermine each other. Naturally, therefore, Galileo's work is
"irrational" and "unmethodical" and of course his behavior is
"anarchistic"* since in order to bring a new research program into the
* It is worth noting that while Feyerabend's actual historic reconstruc-
tion of Galileo's complete lack of support for any of his theories has
been criticised by P.K. Machamer, and his suggestion that Newton wrongly
derived his laws from Kepler has been exposed by I.B. Cohen, his main
insight nevertheless holds true: Both scientists introduced radical
conceptual innovations, that were completely out of step with conventional
ideas.
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world, in order to establish a new form of life, in order to develop a
new language to structure the world, it is critical to demonstrate,
by whatever means, that there are viable alternative modes of perception.
Hence Feyerabend's Dadaism, his anarchism, and his "anything goes"
philosophy.
Elkana accepts completely that science is a culturally determined
system. It is dependent on a scientist's beliefs about science, and
about its role, as well as about what constitute acceptable basic
concepts and what are suitable topics and approaches for scientific
thought or types of explanation - in other words, on culturally
determined images of science and of rationality that are continuously
shifting and changing.
He is, therefore, fully in agreement with Feyerabend on the
impossibility (as well as the unsuitability) of the Lakatosian
demarcation between internal and external history. Indeed, he considers
this demarcation to be a degenerating problem shift, because there is a
great deal more to be explained than just the growth of objective
scientific knowledge. So, while agreeing with Lakatos that, for example,
whether a problem shift is progressive or not is dependent on a
scientist's beliefs, personality, or authority
he also thinks that
it is dependent on what, according to the scientist, are the basic
concepts, theorizing in terms of which is legitimate scientific
thought,... or whether, according to him, it is considered
rational, to explain nature on the basis of conservation laws and
symmetry rules....
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These rational parameters are the images of science.5 0
The example of the positive heuristic is a particularly crucial
one as its independence from active influence is the key to Lakatos'
concept of rationality and to the autonomy of science, thereby
supporting the claim that external history only plays a secondary
supplementary role. (Internal conditions are necessary ones for the
development of new, positive heuristics, whereas external conditions
are not.) Elkana argues that internal necessary conditions produce an
unlimited set of problems, any one of which could be chosen for future
research. Which ones are chosen depends on which ones are in step with
current images of science.
If internal criteria can produce infinite directions for positive
heuristics, and if they can then also indefinitely produce novel facts,
then the real problem of the reconstruction of history becomes one of
reconstructing the decision-making process and the various conflicting
criteria that are brought to bear on the problem; it is not just the
reconstruction of 'rational' history.
These criteria, these images of knowledge, will be part rational
(dependent on the body of existing knowledge, and the prevailing
epistemological theory), and part irrational (the social attitudes and
beliefs, whether within the scientific community or elsewhere, that go
to make up the "spirit of an age").
Elkana expands the area of conflict between competing research
programs to include:
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(i) objectively universally understandable developments in the
body of knowledge;
(ii) rational differences as to the role of science/importance of
science (i.e., alternative images of science);
(iii) non-rational influences on men of science - directly,
politically, or via his institutional framework.5 1
In order to accomplish this, and paralleling Feyerabend's anthropo-
logical approach (see below) to the scientist at work, Elkana follows
Clifford Geertz,52 and defines science as a cultural system. Furthermore,
and even more critically, he defines it "not as an experimental science
in quest of law, but an interpretive one in search of meaning."53
Science, then, just as any other cultural system (religions, art, common-
sense, etc.) is an interpretation of the immediacies of experience, "and
all these cultural systems are equally valid." Indeed the behavior of
cultural systems is strikingly similar to that of science. Again quoting
Geertz, Elkana argues that "religion, common-sense can be questioned,
disputed, affirmed, developed, formalized, taught, etc...." and can vary
dramatically from one people to the next in the same way as science does.
5 4
We can see once more, in the tradition of positive problem shifts in the
rationalist epistemological research program, that now any independent
empirical justification for science has been abandoned, and there is now
no demarcation between external and internal. All of it is the province
of the history of science when viewed as a cultural system. But Elkana
argues that this is not complete relativism either, and introduces the
concept of "two-tier thinking,"55 which maintains realism within a given
cultural framework but claims relativism between frameworks. It thereby
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precludes any all-embracing theory of culture - that is, of a notion of
"culture" independent of a given frame of reference. Realism and
relativism may be held simultaneously, and their connection lies in the
various hierarchies of images of knowledge which bridge the gap between
social norms, values, and ideologies, and the body of knowledge, the
"permeable membrane" between relativism and rationality.
Rejecting any theory of culture and certainly any universal theory
of rationality, Elkana adopts Geertz' ethnographic analytic tool of
"thick description"56 to describe all the overlaying, interacting
conceptual structures that the scientist must deal with. They may come
from the body of knowledge itself; they may be epistemological; they may
involve various sources, and various images, of knowledge. To identify
the different layers and their interaction is thick description.
Furthermore, in the transition from the conceptual frameworks of
one scientist to another's, and at the core of the controversies between
one research program and another, lies a different hierarchy in the
sources, images, etc. of science itself. And which of the given sources
in a given time, place, and culture is considered primary, (or is consi-
dered at all), is socially determined, and has very little to do with the
body of knowledge itself. So, as in Galileo's case, the conflict
between Aristotelianism and Copernicanism is one involving the primacy
of "celestial harmony" as a metaphysical principle, over observation or
calculation.5 7
Here again we can notice a remarkable parallel with Feyerabend, but
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contradiction in the assumptions at the core of their respective
research programs. Feyerabend, too, points to the introduction of new
metaphysics and new images of knowledge (to borrow from Elkana), which
he however considers to be incommensurable with the previous framework,
because it consists in a different, untranslatable language with which
to view and structure the world. That alternative world views are
incommensurable is the hard core of Feyerabend's program. That they are
commensurable, and can be translated, albeit in a complex way which may
never be totally explainable and which Elkana does not attempt here, is
the hard core of Elkana's position. (It is especially relevant to note
here that several of the papers on which the present study is based are
taken from Elkana's work-in-progress, which is to be an examination of
the methodology to be used in writing a history of the past four hundred
years of Western science - that is, in attempting just that act of
comparing and translating.)* But both Elkana and Feyerabend adopt a
hermeneutic 'anthropological' approach to the actual work and
deliberations of the scientist, which is "thick description" is Elkana's
terminology. Elkana's aim is to understand and describe the process of
development of Western science. Feyerabend's is to understand the
nature of the alternative forms of life and their transitions in order to
proliferate them, as we shall see later.
* In this context, see also Elkana's "The Problem of Knowledge," in which
he examines the difficulties involved in 'transplanting' sophisticated
Western science to Third-World countries without disturbing traditional
culture.
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Let us now be more specific about Elkana's version of the growth
of scientific knowledge. Following Lakatos he maintains that knowledge
grows through a continuous competition between world views or scientific
research programs. For the purpose of analysis he identifies three
factors, determined by time and culture, which interact, and cannot
really be distinguished. They are, as we have seen, the body of
knowledge, the images of knowledge, and the set of general social values
and norms.
The body of knowledge is the set of methods, problems to be solved,
scientific research programs and their hard cores which at any time go
to make up the existing state of knowledge. There will be a number of
competing research programs, and whether there is consensus between
them and they talk about 'objective scientific knowledge' will depend on
whether they share the same (socially determined) images of knowledge,
and whether they assign the same importance to them.58
The images of knowledge concern the task of science (understanding,
prediction...) and its sources (authority, revelation, analogy,
experiment...), etc. These images suggest which problems out of the
many raised by the body of knowledge will be pursued. Methodologies,
for example, operate by social consensus, and are decreed to be
acceptable. These images of knowledge will include, among many others,
which sources of knowledge are acceptable, and which have the greatest
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importance.* This can be sense experience, revelation, authority, analogy,
novelty, beauty, etc...; there is also a hierarchy among images
according to how widely shared they are (by a culture, a community, a
discipline, a laboratory). There is a hierarchy of duration of images
of knowledge and of 'hierarchies' of images; the image may be linked to
other social norms or ideologies. (A prevalent anti-religious
materialism would heavily influence the order among sources of legitimi-
zation: novelty would be supported over tradition, for example.)5 9
For every group under study there are many images in a hierarchical
order that is itself an important image. These images and hierarchies
have no absolute justification, and change over time. They are the
bridge between social norms and values and the body of knowledge, and
none of them are determinable from the body of knowledge itself.
The problem shift from Lakatos is very far-reaching: where Lakatos
sees an internal theory of methodologies subject to internal replacement
by a more progressive one, Elkana sees an existing but shifting body of
knowledge and a set of historically determined images; where Lakatos
sees positive heuristics internally determining new problems, and
ignoring counter-instances, Elkana sees the action of hierarchies of
images of knowledge, which will also cut off degenerating research
* An example of a type of hierarchy is neoplatonic metaphysics:
Illumination from a divine source was considered the most fundamental
source of knowledge. Sense- or experimental data were secondary sources
of knowledge, and when knowledge is available from both sources there is
a complex set of rules defining relations within the hierarchy.
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programs.
But, while Elkana.does represent a positive problem shift in the
rationalist research program (now the relativist research program) and
will be able to explain many new facts, the competition is not yet
over. Elkana must still overcome Feyerabend's skepticism that his
theory of images and their change will truly come to grips with the
problem. of translation between world views, and must also explain,
better than Lakatos can, what it is about Western science, among so many
other possibilities, that make it so "successful," something which his
hermeneutic understanding of the processes involved will probably not
reveal. The normative aspects of epistemology (if only from the point
of view of allocating funds to competing research programs) is still a
critical one, even if the 'standards' are relativized.
Let us examine Feyerabend's view on incommensurability, and the
importance of its analysis for the history and philosophy of science,
and compare his views on the theory/observation dichotomy and on the
context of discovery/context of justification demarcation with Elkana's.
Feyerabend argues, following Whorf's analysis of language, that
certain types of theory, namely fully mature research programs, are
incommensurable because they do not just describe events, facts, states
of affairs, but also shape them -- they have a structure, a grammar, that
contains their own cosmology, their own covert classifications of reality
(and also, therefore, their own built-in resistances to alternative
theories) which influence thought, behaviour, and perception. (The
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transitions between major scientific research programs is indeed
categorized by discovery of these covert categorizations, which although
unconscious, influenced all previous argument.)
They are as different as are the different aspects of a visual
illusion, where, according to Feyerabend, because different mental sets
are involved in the classification of a particular diagram, "a direct
comparison is impossible. We may compare the two attitudes in our
memory, but not while attending to the same picture."
6 0
Fig. 1
Any picture, Figure 1 for example,61 which shows some perspective is an
excellent illustration of this point. This one may be treated as a
three dimensional drawing of a cube in perspective, or as a two
dimensional pattern in a plane. And it is not possible to focus on the
transition. The two different perceived images depend on two different
mental states, and we can only jump from one to the other.
But Feyerabend goes further, trying to illustrate the incommensura-
bility of the world views of two people, one who sees perspective and
the other who does not. Once perspective has been seen, then the "flat"
interpretation can only be interpreted as part of an illusion by the
perspective-seer - but the two dimensional interpretation, as seen by the
non-perspective-seer, is not an illusion.
6 2
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Using an 'instrumentalistic' interpretation of the theories,
which sees in them no more than instruments for the clarification
of certain facts, one gets the impression that there is some
common subject matter. Using a 'realistic' interpretation that
tries to understand a theory in its own terms, such a subject
matter seems to disappear,... (leaving only) a definite feeling
that it must exist.63
At no time, then, is it the case that one is a development, an
elaboration, of its predecessor. For Feyerabend, the overlap is as big
an illusion as is the 'explanation' or 'inclusion' of an early "version"
by its more successful successor.
Despite the fact that these frameworks of thought, forms of life,
and the language in which they express themselves are incommensurable,
there is a temptation to describe them as primitive forerunners of
Western common-sense, or to categorize them in terms of peculiar
methodological preconceptions of Western science.
This is equivalent to trying to introduce concepts and ways of
thinking, from a language that is different from ours, by writing a
dictionary, a simple translation of primitive terms into English. These
ways of thought can only be learned, and this learning process must not
be cluttered with preconceived laws of the "illiterate logician" (as
Feyerabend calls him), because if it is the most important parts may well
be overlooked. This hermeneutic, anthropologist's approach is strikingly
similar to Elkana's approach.
To return to Feyerabend's anthropological analogy: Since English,
for example, is incommensurable with the language of any particular
people, he will not find translation possible. He will have to build up
- 37 -
a new language-game, made up on English words, perhaps, but used in an
unusual, and, at first, perhaps even nonsensical way. He will only be
able to start explanations within his new linguistic system until it
has become quite complex. This new language-game will not be English,
because even though any anthropological field study may be "translated"
into English, this would be a distortion of the original idiom, radically
altering its grammar, and thereby remain unable to reveal its true
world view. 64
Any distinction between a theory and an observation is clearly
futile, since the conceptual context of any observation, of any
'natural interpretation,' is itself a research program, a world view
that has its own metaphysical hard core, ideologies, images of knowledge,
all embedded in its particular linguistic resources, and which, for
Feyerabend, would render these contexts incommensurable. It is equally
clear that any attempt at distinguishing the context of 'discovery' from
the context of 'justification' is futile, because it can only mean
describing a form of life with a "language" whose "grammar" and whose
logic undermines and contradicts that which is being described (that is,
the framework belonging to the putative 'discovery').6 5
Elkana, acting on the assumption that different conceptual contexts
are commensurable and translatable, and adopting his two-tier approach,
argues that for any given context, it is decided what concepts are
observational, and which theoretical. So, when trying to test a hypo-
thesis against "facts," the validity of these "facts" (along with their
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inherent theory-laden-ness) is provided by the framework. It is only
relative to a given, particular cultural framework that we temporarily
suspend our relativizing and become realists.6 6
Elkana goes on to suggest an observation/theory continuum, ranging
from what is by consensus, unproblematic and explained (extreme near),
to what is problematic and alien (extreme distant), within a framework.6 7
It is possible for experience for concepts to become experience near,
as knowledge grows.* But as Elkana points out, it must be remembered
that the background knowledge, the accepted conventions and consensus of
a specific community, is itself a scientific research program with all the
same ingredients: hard core, auxiliary theories, scientific metaphysics,
images of knowledge, and ideologies.
Clearly, then, even experience near concepts may have to be
abandoned if for one reason or another they appear incorrect. Indeed
the layers of thick description (the layers of images of knowledge, etc...)
that make up an observational context, an experience near concept, must
be unraveled as a prerequisite for change. But
the elimination of a 'natural interpretation,' and its replacement
by a new one, is tantamount to the creation of a new observation
language - or, by changing the context, making an experience near
term for a previously experience distant one.68
* Thus, a concept like "atom" in the 1370's was experience distant
("observational"), while a concept like "gene" today is experience near
("theoretical"). This does not imply a genuine demarcation between
theoretical and observational, just that the body of accepted knowledge
today contains a larger number of theories that are "plausible" and,
partially, at least, supported by evidence -- and thus, experience near.
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The resistance, then, on the part of Aristotelians to Galileo's new
observation language is explained by a confrontation between two
socially determined views about knowledge acquisition (on earth and
above it).
The growth (or is it just change?) of science can be explained (or
is it just described?) by this process of-sets of socially determined
images of knowledge superceeding one another.
As far as the context of justification and discovery dichotomy is
concerned, and continuing with the two tier thinking/thick description
approach, Elkana argues that:
What is required is an analysis of theories which concerns itself
with the epistemic factors governing the discovery, the
development, and acceptance or rejection of theories. Science is
done within a Weltanschauung... and the job of philosophy of
science is to analyse what is characteristic of a specific
Weltanschauung.6 9
And Elkana aims to define this Weltanschauung by uncovering the layers
of thick description that go to make it up - by undertaking his own
archeology of knowledge.
Clearly, as there is no external, a-cultural system of reference,
there can be no external discussion of reasonableness, and hence no
"justification" of historical actions, from the point of view of a
different frame. All that can be said is that for a given (cultural)
context there may be consensus about what is reasonable and what is
relevant. So, relative to this framework, we may decide a context of
justification (just as, relative to framework, we can define an
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observation/theory difference). Then a consensus is possible about the
ordering of theories according to their rationality. Then we can define
a methodology, then there can be progress, and then we can distinguish
'good' from 'bad' theories, according to our images of knowledge.
Continuing along this line we can also argue that commensurability
can also be achieved relative to a framework. If scientsts, in a
community, share images of knowledge, they will probably reach consensus
about which theories are better than others. If they do not, if there
are divergent images or hierarchies of images, then disputes will arise,
and a continuous critical dialogue will emerge, as the basis of these
different "articulations of images.''70
But this does not answer Feyerabend's critical accusation, that,
different major research programs do not share any content, since the
meaning of any theoretical term depends on its theoretical context, as
its value (in the Saussurian sense) within the (theoretical) world view.
Feyerabend might concede that scientists sharing the same hierarchies of
images of knowledge may well agree on which are the best theories (although
he feels that consensus among scientists is greatly overestimated), but
it is about scientists/theories that do not share images of knowledge
that Feyerabend is concerned (and this criticism would apply equally to
Feyerabend's analysis of observation/theory and contexts of justification/
discovery). Perceiving this problem, and agreeing with Feyerabend that
incommensurability... depends on covert classifications and
conceptual changes... (so that) it is hardly ever possible to
give an explicit definition of it,71
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Elkana proposes that it is more useful to speak of degrees of
incommensurability, possibilities of sharing some content between
theories, and introduces the concept of vague scientific concepts as
playing a critical role in the transition periods between different
theoretical frameworks, as scientists try to develop from one to the
other.72 It is clear that this new, auxiliary hypothesis represents
(in Lakatos' terms) a positive problem shift; Elkana has begun to find
out what results this expanded historiographic category will yield by
applying it to history in his work on the discovery of energy, on the
laws of the conservation of energy, although his results have by no
means been uncontested.
Elkana's research program is clearly progressing, and clearly
constitutes a progressing problem shift from Lakatos'. But it is
equally obvious that a definite answer is far from close. It is hardly
clear that his cognitive concept of vagueness is any closer to the
truth than Feyerabend's model of incommensurable illusions. Nor is the
relationship of an image of knowledge to a Weltanschauung well-defined
(is the latter the sum of the former? does a Weltanschauung determine
images of knowledge? how, then, do new ones arise...?) or that everyone's
images of images are the same, or that any consensus among creative
scientists at the 'frontiers of knowledge' is ever anything more than
partial.
Further, it is not clear what, precisely, the relationship of
images of knowledge to science - its conduct and its history - actually
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is. (Surely, it is not simply the sum of images that impact on actual
science or that are uncovered by anthropological reconstruction; their
effect on the history of science is neither linear nor unmediated.
Do they make up a form of life, common perhaps to all scientists since
... Newton?) Nor can-Elkana explain what makes Western science so
'successful': if 'success' depends on the choice and maintenance of
certain kinds of images, what - and "culture" is no answer - arbitrates
that choice and enforces it? In fact, why and how do certain
hierarchies work better. (Must we return to Lakatos at this point,
given his greater willingness to develop machinery for testing one
approach against another, regardless of the restrictions this procedure
may suggest?) Nor can Elkana provide any guidelines for what a scientist
is to do; resting with description of the process, he leaves the
scientist entirely at the mercy of a whole host of "influences":
professional and cultural values, competing theories and images, none of
which is he likely to fully understand at the time when he is called
upon to choose between them. Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
how can Elkana explain a shift in images of knowledge? That they are
culturally embedded, hierarchically ordered, and so on, is not sufficient'
to understand why these particular images should be realized in a given
time, place, and culture.
Much more critically, it is difficult to see whether Elkana's
hermeneutic approach will ever explain. It is admirably suited for
testing further historical/historiographic theories against the actual
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human experience of science, but it leaves discussion precisely at
the point where we are most deeply implicated and where we are most
interested. For the process of insinuating ourselves into a given
culture in order to unearth its innermost assumptions then denies us
the ability to step out and reformulate our findings with a view
towards discovering a rationale behind not only this one culture, but
its successors as well. Two tier thinking permits us to be realists
within this one framework and experience its logic free of any other
epistemological baggage; but it also commits us to a relativism in
comparing cultures which, while justifiable in the light of so much
epistemic tyranny, precludes even raising - let alone answering -
questions about culture qua culture, conceptual change qua conceptual
change, images of knowledge qua images, and so on.
So Feyerabend is far from through; he too has a progressing program.
While Elkana assumes commensurability and defends this assumption with
the concepts of two tier thinking, thick description, and references,
Feyerabend defends his hard core of incommensurability with proliferation,
the anthropological study of language and meaning, the concept of
conflicting mental sets, and the illusion of commensurability. His aim
is no less than to develop a language, a world view, for understanding
incommensurability, to understand what are forms of life, in all their
diversity, rather than rank them according to some absurd rule, or merely
describe their transition, and this therefore is the reason for his
anti-rationalism. Like Galileo faced with an Aristotelian hegemony,
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Feyerabend wishes to overturn the hegemony of the whole of Western
culture, rationalism, to restructure the grammar of our perception.
Feyerabend's research program is not without its problems: Are
scientific research programs really world views in the sense that
languages are? Could it be that scientific world views, embedded in a
common culture, with its own world view, might be translatable, and not
entirely incommensurable? Or, if research programs are truly
incommensurable, does the possibility of communication collapse? What
does it mean for incommensurability or illusion, when we notice that we
can hold distinct and "incommensurable" perceptions in mind, and compare
them - even jump from one to the other...?
Perhaps the most interesting obsdrvation, and the most basic shift
from the Lakatosian tradition, is that now, in the final analysis, both
research programs rely on cognitive mind-models, or at least analogies,
as auxiliary hypotheses. Just as Elkana's interactions between
theorizer and environment must, at some stage, come to an end with "ideas
which seem to us innate, i.e. genetically conditional, and not
immediately environment-laden," and just as he must rely on a psychological
concept of "conceptual vagueness" to oil the cogs of his research
program, so Feyerabend must rely on his psychological models of language
and illusion. This is perhaps the major consequence of the abandonment
of internal versus external explanations of knowledge, and of the
distinctions between Popper's Worlds 1, 2, and 3.
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II
This section will examine accounts of language and theories of
meaning.
Let us start by locating the Chomskyan position relative to the
problems of empirical knowledge. We have discussed the impossibility
of maintaining a theory of induction not only as a basis for discovering
universal laws, but indeed as a viable basis for explaining or justifying
even the most commonplace of daily behavior. On the level of language,
this problem shows up as a crucial issue in the relation of "world" to
"mind." How can we infer the meaning of words from individual
instances of their use and how do we come to understand and use language
on the basis of such limited and often distorted stimuli; or, to put it
more generally still, what is the relation between an individual's
experience of the real world, his linguistic account of it, and the
knowledge which he acquires? It is not a matter of coincidence or of
analogy that we should raise problems of epistemology in the context of
problems of language and meaning, or vice versa. It should be clear that
any epistemological position will have associated with it a theory of
language and language acquisition just as any theory of language will
have inherent in it a theory or a view of the interaction between the
mind and the empirical world.
As we shall see, language theories will vary precisely according to
the degree of autonomy which they assign to the role of "mind" in
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language, and with the extent to which they assign contributions of
innate structures of the mind to language, its acquisition, and its
use. Just as a Popperian epistemology gives primacy to the mental
activity of inventing theories, and reduces the role of the real world
to that of providing counter-examples, so Chomsky will argue that
genetically determined characteristics and maturation processes must
be the prime mover - the mind must provide "theories," innate properties,
and organizing principles, that categorize experience and set the
limits to what can be known. On the other hand, we will expect to find,
paralleling Feyerabend's relativism, positions on meaning which will give
the greatest priority to the social determinants of language and language
use. We will use as representative examples the work of Saussure and
of Wittgenstein. It is important to note that any theory of language
and meaning must take some position on the nature and function of innate
structures, just as any theory of knowledge is deficient if it does not
give an account of the origin, nature, and scope of rationality.
As we shall see, while the'scope and subject-matter of these
competing theories is often different, they are by no means necessarily
either incompatible or incommensurable, and there is no reason why it
should not be possible for what I regard as the individual truths of
these apparently contradictory positions to be regarded as complementary.
Chomsky, then, rejects any theories of language use and
acquisition that depend on chance regularities in the environment and
their reinforcement, as well as any theory that would have the mind
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producing random "theories," some of which are confirmed by the
environment, thus producing the consistency which we recognize in
language. It is simply not possible that language should be acquired
in this way, and such a theory will never be able to explain the
appropriate use of language in new situations for which the organism
has never had any prior experience to condition its appropriate response.
For Chomsky there must be something outside of experience which makes
our understanding of the world possible.
However, unlike Russell who argues that:
Induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being
inferred either from experience or from other logical 7rinciples,
and ... without this principle science is impossible.
Chomsky appeals instead to a Kantian notion of the innateness of
forms of knowledge, which take on the role formerly assigned to induction:
Intrinsic principles of mental organization permit the construction
of rich systems of knowledge and belief on the basis of
scattered evidence.
He thus aligns himself with C.S. Peirce, arguing that:
The limits of human knowledge are determined by the rules that
limit admissible hypotheses which might conceivably be fairly
restrictive. 7 4
It is Chomsky's hope that the study of language will reveal rules
that are biologically determined, and discard those that are merely the
result of history.
The central question, for Chomsky, both epistemologically and for
the study of language, is:
How is it that human beings, whose contact with the world is so
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brief and personal and limited are nevertheless able to know as
much as they do. 75
He shifts the focus of the discussion from definitions of the
justification of rational discourse, the definitions of rationality,
and their testing in the light of history, to a discussion of the
biological conditions of knowledge, shifting the main burden of
explanation to the structure of the mind.
Naturally, while it is these cognitive structures that allow the
relations with the real world that we see, they will also limit what
can be known. Indeed, it is a condition of knowing that there be
restrictive conditions on what can be known. For this reason, very
general theories about the cognitive capacities of all organisms or
theories about all human capacities will necessarily ignore those rich
and very specifically designed aspects of the organism that allow it to
function as it does.
It is the biologically determined structures of the mind that
determine and allow interpretation of the world, and there is no reason
to suppose that any of our cognitive faculties should be any different.
Evidence suggests that the same applies to the structuring of the visual
world, and Chomsky would like to extend our model for the acquisition
of common-sense knowledge into the biological domain also. It is
critical to notice that what is in question here is, of course, not the
hypothesis that the mind has an innate organization, any more than it is
disturbing to notice that there is a genetic code which determines that
we have limbs and organs in a particular configuration.
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Every theory about our cognitive faculties and their acquisition
must address the issue and in any event, will make implicit assumptions
about it. What is at stake here is the investigation of the role and
limits of these domains, and the degree to which we can say that innate
structures dominate the limits, acquisition, and use of our cognitive
capacities.
To put the issue more clearly still, any approach to behavior will
have to have hypotheses about the nature of some innate mechanisms.
Chomskyan linguistics emphasize the poverty of the environmental stimuli
that a child is subject to when he learns language, relative to his
ability to understand and reproduce sentences that he has never heard
before. They propose theories of syntax that are testable, and that can,
in theory, eventually lead to explanations of "deep structures" that can
be formulated in physical mechanistic terms. Other schools of linguists
emphasize the context-sensitivity of language, that it is a social
institution as much as a set of innate cognitive structures. But even a
-purely behaviorist approach to language will have to propose a mechanism
that will account for language use and acquisition.
Generally, it is important to recall in this context that theories
of this sort must distinguish between behavior that could be genetically
transmitted, and behavior that in fact has been, since some behavior/
behavioral information is clearly culturally transmitted. Mankind, by
virtue of its ability to record and pass on what has been learned, has
the ability to modify its behavior to suit changing environments,
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without the need for genetic change, or for genetic coding of
particular behaviors. The linguistic faculty itself is a sufficient
evolutionary advance to make possible a very large range of behaviors,
and cultural dynamics, however large or small its survival value, is as
significant a transmitter of behaviors as genetic coding.
It is Chomsky's strategy in this context to concentrate on the pre-
conditions for language use rather than on its actual practice in
specific situations, for two reasons. Firstly, because it is a utopian
project to attempt analysis, in real situations, of all the relevant
stimuli on the individual, and all of the aspects of its life history,
that prompt a particular response. Secondly, this project is
worthless because if our account of language is not to be a catalogue
of "influences," devoid of any explanatory power, it must include a level
of abstraction from the facts, a level of generality that will be
necessarily involved in the nature of the given cognitive realms, their
relations among each other and to experience. (We will say more of
Chomsky's method of abstraction, his methodological approach later, but
we should notice that it consists in nothing that is different from the
process of providing theories that we have discussed above.) The
endeavor should therefore consist in trying to discover "those cognitive
domains for which the organism has an intrinsic [innate] cognitive
theory";76 in other words, one which is not dependent on some kind of
inductively based acquisition. In fact:
...for any domain it is reasonable to assume that there exists
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a schematism defining the class of cognitive structures that
can be attained.
It is because of these innate schematisms that:
Complex, highly articulated cognitive structures can be attained
with considerable uniformity among individuals as the basis of
scattered and restrictive evidence.7 7
There is an extremely important contrast between Chomsky's attitude
that in order to use language (or any other cognitive faculty) normally
within a speech community we must share the same mental structures, and
a conventionalist or structuralist view point which would argue that
participation in a (speech) community depends on the participation in
the necessary social conventions.
This contrast shows up clearly the accounts of meaning provided by
each of these two views. For Chomsky, meaning - of words, of sentences -
must be predicated on a system of innate structures. What is important,
and empirically testable, is the degree to which
Experience... plays some role in the innately-given schematism
for interpretation of the world of human experience.
7 8
A whole host of factors may play a role, from "spatio-temporal
continuity" to "figure ground and other gestalt properties," but this is
clearly insufficient. Chomsky therefore rejects any Wittgensteinian
notion that the meaning of words is a function of either verbal or
ostensive definition since both
... can [only] be interpreted properly by someone who controls
a rich, highly articulated theory of language and of the world.
7 9
It is important to note a curious parallelism between this view and
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Wittgenstein's. Indeed, the well-known difficulties of explaining
almost any word (Wittgenstein's continuous attempts at defining the
noun "game" is an excellent example), and the understanding of any
expression are, on this account, dependent on an equally."rich" system
of interrelated meanings whose framework is a "theory of language and
of the world" implicit in a culture's attitude (rather than in an
individual's mental structure) which consists of a network of
linguistic convention.
The distinction between Wittgenstein's view and that of Chomsky
when Chomsky argues that
We can easily imagine how an organism endowed with the conditions
on the forms and organization of language could construct a
specific system of interconnections among concepts and
conditions of use and reference, on the basis of scanty evidence. 8 0
And further claims that
The semantic system of language is given largely by a power
independent of conscious choice.81
is, in my opinion, a distinction depending on alternative focuses of
interest - we could say, in Lakatos' terms, hard cores. It is my
argument that these hard cores are not incommensurable. While the
Chomskyan research program emphasizes, and establishes as a necessary
basis for linguistics, the understanding of the types of mechanism (of
necessity, genetically determined), innate structures that make
linguistic communication possible, Wittgenstein stresses instead the
social variance and accord within the system, on the nature of the
shifting balance between individual's limitless potential (perhaps
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determined by genetic limits) for expression and his ability to
communicate through conventionally constrained means.
It is a perfectly acceptable thesis that there are "innate
principles of mind that make possible the acquisition of knowledge and
systems of belief," but there is a great difference between seeing
these attributes as a potential of the organism to organize, understand,
etc., and arguing that specific aspects of the organism's beliefs are
genetically determined.
It is also clear that a legitimate aim of biology, and of linguistics
on Chomsky's model, is to understand the nature of that potential and its
limits. Thus in examining the actual behavior of organisms, we will
expect it to be a function of genetically determined faculties and growth
processes and of the organism's particular life history. It is clear
that Chomsky's notion of competence in the language we speak is a
function both of our genetically determined linguistic faculties and of
our environment - we are competent in English, after all. But there is
no reason not to extend the argument further and follow, to a certain
extent, a "Wittgensteinian" or "Saussurian" view of language, a view
which focuses on the socially determined aspects of language - that is,
on language as performance of a particularly constrained and yet flexible
kind.
Where the boundary is drawn in the view we adopt defines a line
between a deterministic view of biological processes and attributes from
one which is interested in biological potentials and their impact. As
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Chomsky points out, the position of the boundary between the biological
and the social in the acquisition of knowledge in general and of linguis-
tic meaning in particular should not be "uninvestigatable, any more than
any other biological phenomenon is." 8 2 But it is equally important to
note that, when we are interested in the actual behavior of an organism,
or the actual use of a language, we cannot give causal priority to either
the innate or the social.
* Before continuing with Chomsky's description of the actual approach
adopted by his analysis of language, it is worth concentrating for a mo-
ment on his own methodology and on the term "mentalism" which is used
in this context.
Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, we should note that Chomsky's
"mentalism," methodologically, is mentalism as opposed to superficial
descriptions - that is, it is synonomous with theoretical. It is not
mentalism as opposed to materialism; it is not the emphasis on mind and
its structure as opposed to emphasis on the physiological mechanisms of the
body. In this context, it is important that Chomskyan linguistics sat
against the prevailing Bloomfieldian "taxonomic linguistics," whose aim
it was to avoid any reference to mental processes of any kind, but in
particular to any vague notions of mind, which were so inaccessible as
to be untestable.
Katz describes the controversy between mentalists and taxonomists as
one between those who argue that "linguistic theories must contain
concepts which enable linguists to formulate the principle of mental
operation that underlies speech" and those who maintain that "purely
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linguistic theories" are concerned with "predicting and exploring the
facts of linguistic performance."8 3
But the appeal to linguistic acts is not an appeal to a dualist
psychology, since linguistic theories are, of necessity, abstract
formalizations which correspond to actual neurophysiological structures.
So the linguist's task is to
provide a theory which represents the structure of [which] any
physical system must possess if it is to be capable of linguistic
communication... These theoretical constructs... are intended
to have psychological reality... [even if they do not] for the
linguist require translation into neurophysiological terms. 84
It is also important that the move from taxonomy of surface
structures to "mentalism" is a move which greatly expands the explanatory
power of the theories into domains which are totally foreign to
taxonomy. This comes as no surprise in view of the epistemology we have
been examining, as well as the cognitive position Chomsky is putting
forth. As I have argued above, and will mention repeatedly below, the
relationship of an attitude toward language to a concommitant view of
knowledge and the mind as knower is never accidental; a commitment on one
issue implies a commitment on the other.
To return to Chomsky's analysis of the biologically determined
structures of language:
The system of mechanisms and principles put to work in the
acquisition of knowledge of language is the particular cognitive
structure we call grammar.8 5
Since language is common to the whole human species, but since
particular languages obviously vary, it is necessary to posit a
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universal grammar that determines the system of rule for all natural
languages. What is finally learned as a language will have "the
properties of a universal grammar and other, accidental ones."8 6
The key to discovering properties of this universal grammar is the
discovery of invariant aspects of language that are clearly not
learned. These abound in the rules of syntax, all of which importantly
are characterized by their "structural dependence" (see below), a
quality which is by no means necessary for any language, or even
communicatively efficient, or learned - all characteristics which lead
to the conclusion that they may be qualities of universal grammar. Thus
Stimulated by appropriate and continuing experience the language
faculty creates a grammar that generates an infinite class of
sentences with formal and semantic properties.3 7
However,
This might not be the case. It is a coherent and perhaps correct
proposal that linguistic faculty constructs a grammar only in
conjunction with other faculties of mind. 8 8
In particular, it would not be unreasonable to argue that the
language faculty acts in conjunction with that faculty that allows the
acquisition of common-sense knowledge.* This would not necessarily
refute the notion of language as being predicated on a separate mental
structure, but places it in specific relation to other mental faculties.
This, however, is a matter to be decided by testing and investigating
* This does not imply any identity between types of common-sense
knowledge which in the Geertz sense vary across cultures, but rather
that certain cognitive bases are common to them - for example, the
permanence of objects.
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alternative empirical theories.
Chomsky's position is that
there is an autonomous system of formal grammar, determined
in principle by the language faculty and its component
universal grammar. 88a
This formal grammar generates abstract structures that are associated
with "logical forms" by further principles of grammar. Beyond this it
may be impossible to distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic
components of knowledge and belief.
It is worth pausing again to try to determine the impact of the
approach. We noted earlier that Chomsky shifts the burden of
explanation for the acquisition of knowledge, and therefore of language,
to the mind, and to the limits it imposes on what can be known.
Epistemologically this places Chomsky very close to Peirce's theory
of adduction, in which the mind possesses natural aptitudes for the
invention of hypotheses of certain kinds. Similarly with meaning, and
in particular when we consider problems of naming which, for Chomsky,
involve both the system of language and the system of "common sense
understanding," which allow us to determine the categories named. Both
of these are predicated on cognitive structures. In a certain sense,
this approximates the notion common to Wittgenstein and Saussure that
the system of language is intimately tied to a system of common sense
understanding - of language containing, reinforcing, and shaping
conceptual categories. The crucial difference is, of course, whether
mind or social convention is taken as the vehicle of this association.
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A great many assumptions are brought to bear when objects are named,
and for Chomsky what is of interest in this process is its biological
aspects. For Wittgenstein, these assumptions are a part of a language
game; Chomsky has placed the domain of social habits in the structure of
the mind. Yet for both accounts, it is not the absolute characteristics
of the object itself that determines what can be named, since it is un-
likely that these can be known, or that it is necessary to know them.
Chomsky also argues that although "creativity," the appropriate
use of totally new sentences in totally new situations, is a crucial
aspect of language, this does not mean that we cannot study language
independently from actual communication - that is, from its creative
context. This is clearly implicit in any abstract, theoretical approach
to language, but it also entails that a discussion of language based on
"speech acts," or on the intent of the speaker, or on the specific
conditions of communication will be entirely inadequate. It certainly
precludes the definition of meaning in terms only of the actual
linguistic behavior that takes place.
Intent as a determinant of meaning is a particularly loaded notion
in view of the fact that it has traditionally been accorded great
importance in the history of art and architecture. It seems clear that
"intent" is not sufficient to determine meaning; a speaker's intent is
only one, and probably an insignificant one at that, of the components
of interpretation. Further, I do not need to know a speaker's intent to
understand anything that he says; in fact, I do not need to have access
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to any of his inner processes and experiences. This is the case both
for a cognitivist viewpoint, in which access to language depends on
sharing the same cognitive structures, and also from a conventionalist
point of view, in which it depends on sharing the same language-game.
Neither cognitive structures nor conventional associations and usages
will sustain an appeal to intent, the former because intent will be
unable to say anything about the universal structures common to all
linguistic behaviors, and the latter because the notion of intent steps
outside the bounds of what can be commonly understood through
language.
Thus Chomsky argues against any position that attempts to explain
meaning-determining rules as a function of communication, since an
appeal to communicating (of an idea) as an explanation of meaning will
only arrive at an analysis of successful communication, not of the
conditions of meaning.89 Indeed, he argues that communication is only
one function of language, not an essential one. Hence any instrumental
analysis of the language game is misleading. Expressions can be used
with their strict linguistic meaning, irrespective of the intentions of
the speaker and the attitudes of the audience.9 0
This clearly results in an attitude for which the "rules which
determine meaning are social conventions" is inadequate, since what is
primary must be the innate cognitive structure, since conditioning and
training cannot possibly account for its acquisition. There can be no
question of conscious choice of rules, or of social determination of
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them. Nor can social custom explain language creativity. It is
critical for the Chomskyan position to distinguish rules of
acquisition from rules of use.
Just as Chomsky, in assigning priority to structures of mind and
to cognitive determinants of language, significantly undermines the
taxonomic conception of language as nomenclature and language use and
acquisition as inductive, so too views which instead focus on a view of
language as a social system also reject the taxonomic attitude and again
re-define the interrelationships of thought, language, and world. The
initial impact of Saussure's work was, in fact, to refute the taxonomic
ideal as reflected in the strict historicism of previous linguists.
* ** * * *
The notion that language is a nomenclature, a set of words each of
which corresponds to a particular thing, has a long history. It depends
on realism, on the view that the world is ordered into categories of
objects independently of any intervention by man. Each category is
necessarily, therefore, identified by a name, which just stands for its
correlate in the real world. Thus, in the Aristotelian formulation,
states of mind are the same for everyone, as are things, and
these states are the reflections of things which are the same
for everyone.91
So language reflects our perception of reality, which is in turn a
reflection of the organization of reality. Language does not intervene
in our understanding of the world, or in our organization of it; it is
transparent. If the world is the same for everyone, and if we can
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communicate with one another, the meaning of words must be identical
for everyone (and correspond directly to the world). Thus communication
is guaranteed through a necessary identity of thought, meaning, and
reference.
The difficulty of maintaining this transparent correspondence should
be clear given the difficulty we have in determining true theories about
the world, and this is only emphasized by cultural differences. The lack
of coincidence, for example, between the vocabularies of different
languages, and the difficulty of translating from one to another,
immediately puts the thesis in doubt, beginning to make clear that the
relations between words and things is problematic. There is clearly a
direct parallel between the failure to sustain the direct connection
between the real world and linguistic categories and the failure to
maintain simple inductive rules for the relation between experience and
knowledge.
In fact, it is very important to recall here that it is precisely
this view of the correspondence between world/language/mind/knowledge
described above that constituted the traditional philosophical under-
pinnings of induction; and induction was only then perceived as problem-
atic at the historical point when this model began to crumble. Further,
just as at the collapse of inductivism two distinct methods of handling
knowledge emerged, so too with the breakdown of the strict correspondence
between words and things the stage is set for two distinct approaches to
language. Paralleling epistemological attitudes, these are the search
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for an internal, cognitively-based logic of language, on the one hand,
and an external, culturally-based account of linguistic relativism on
the other. In either case, language, whether determined by mind or
based on convention, interposes itself between facts and ideas, between
the world and our knowledge of it.
We have examined some of the implications of the former approach in
our discussion of the work of Noam Chomsky; we now turn to the work of
Saussure to examine the other.
Saussure's starting point may be understood as the awareness of the
individuality of every linguistic utterance, and in particular, of the
complexity of the interactions between speech and context and between
language and society that contribute to the understanding of these
unique speech-acts between separate individuals. He is extremely aware
of the many aspects from which one can approach language. So what is
language?
C'est a la fois un produit social de la faculte du langage et
un ensemble de conventions necessaires, adoptees par le corps
social pour permettre l'exercice de cette faculte chez les
individus. Pris dans son tout, le langage est multiforme et
heteroclite; a cheval sur plusieurs domaines, a la fois physique,
physiologique et psychique, il appartient encore au domaine
individuelyt au domaine social; il ne se laisse classer dans
aucune categorie des fait humains, parce qu'on ne sait
comment degager son unite.92
Thus language is the product both of the human faculty that allows
speech and of social conventions adopted to permit the exercise of this
faculty. It is important to notice that Saussure rejects the primacy of
the biological (which he does acknowledge) by arguing that language is
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essentially a convention. This is perhaps because there seems to be
no indication in Saussure that the structure of the mind could play
any predetermined biological role. When Saussure speaks of the
biological, he tends to speak primarily of the vocal auditory system.
When he speaks of mind, he tends to limit himself to individual
psychological phenomena, whose character is personal and specific to a
particular context related to the production of an idea, rather than to
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a set of generalizable characteristics.
Saussure rejects any view of language as nomenclature. He replaces
it with a conception of language as a system of signs. These signs are
not the mere assigning of a name to a thing, but the association of a
concept with a sound. These two elements - concept and acoustic image -
are what are termed the "signified" and the "signifier," and together
form a sign.94 It is clear, for Saussure, that the system of concepts
is a continuum with no pre-determined organization with which the
system of sound (also a continuum) is to correspond. Sounds and meaning
form two continuous series which it is always possible to sub-divide
further. Speakers, users of a particular language, are able to identify
groupings in these series, and the totality of these groupings is langue.
The most important characteristic of these signs is that any signifier
may be associated arbitrarily with any signified.95 This crucial
characteristic largely determines the nature of Saussure's system; the
rationale for this association is arbitrary. Saussure in speculating
upon the future role that semiology might have in understanding sign-
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systems in general extends the concept of arbitrariness to all such
systems.
...tout moyen d'expression recu dans une societe repose en
principe sur une habitude collective ou, ce qui revient au
meme, sur la convention.9 6
The use of any social sign, whether or not it has any intrinsic
expressive value, will depend on a system of social conventions that
determine its use in particular situations.
The arbitrariness of these signs should not distract our attention
from the fact that language is not chosen by a linguistic community.
That is, while the relationship between the signifier and the signified
is arbitrary in the sense that it lacks an external justification
beyond convention, it is not thereby a matter of individual choice.
Indeed, it is the arbitrary nature of signs which tends to explain the
fact that language is not consciously changed, the way other social
institutions may be: the very arbitrariness of the sign tends to make
change in it rather pointless. Furthermore, language belongs to
everybody; it is constantly in use; we are, and must be, too involved
with it to detach ourselves from it long enough to bend it.
C'est parce que le signe est arbitraire qu'il ne connait d'autre
loi que celle de la tradition, et c'est parce qu'il se fonde
sur la tradition qu'il peut etre arbitraire.9 7
Although the arbitrariness of the signifier/signified relationship
tends to protect it from active societal manipulation, it is this very
arbitrariness which makes possible the displacement of the one relative
to the other through time, while allowing the system of language to
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remain intelligible. Arbitrariness protects language from manipulation
yet assures change. Indeed, Saussure observes that no language is
immune from change over time. Thus, while society is largely powerless
to change its linguistic skin, it is also powerless to stop its
changing.
This fact of the continuing shift of relations between signifier
and signified re-emphasizes the rejection of language-as-nomenclature,
and indeed, makes necessary a radical alternative: There can be no
"real categories" to which linguistic terms can correspond. Language's
organization is independent of the world's organization; indeed,
language, as an historically determined set of conventions, imposes its
own categorization on the world we perceive.9 8
This raises another crucial characteristic of the Saussurian
system. If linguistic terms do not derive their meaning from categories
in the real world, how do they mean? A sign only has a meaning when it
is understood relative to the other elements in a linguistic system.
Let us illustrate this point by referring to Saussure's analogy to a chess
game to which we will return frequently. The elements in a chess game -
castle, pawn, etc. - derive their meaning from their relations to one
another. They have a certain value relative to the set of pieces ( a
value which may change in shifting configurations). Furthermore, the
actual physical realization of the pieces demonstrates the arbitrariness
of the sign's relation to their sensory manifestations (signifier) -
the actual piece may take on any number of shapes and may be made in any
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material and still retain the same significance. 9 9
Units of the chess game have no material entity, since they have
no necessary physical properties. Saussure makes a critical distinction
between the language-unit and its actual physical manifestation (that is,
between the sign and its signifier). Furthermore, as we have seen,
the arbitrary nature of sign, relying for its definition solely on its
relation to other signifiers and signifieds, is purely relational and
abstract as well; signs do not stand for anything in particular, they
too are distinguished from their particular manifestation.
La langue, est un tout en soi.. et un principe de classification.10 0
Can we be more specific about the role of these linguistic signs?
Clearly, the same word, spoken by different people, will not sound
identical, nor will the same word, used in different situations,
necessarily mean the same thing. Thus, the reason for which we can
speak of the 8:45 express from Geneva, notes Saussure, whether it is
made up of entirely different locomotives and carriages every time,
whether over the years it becomes much faster, or even whether it is late,
is that the entity we are referring to is not a purely material one.101
It derives its identity from its position in a system - in this case, the
system of train routes and times, i.e., the timetable. Again, we return
to the problem of value.
Language, for Saussure, is only a system of values. It is an
"algebra" of variables in which different instantiations yield different
mathematical significances - different values. 1 0 2
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Sans le secours des signes, nous serions incapables de10 3
distinguer deux idles d'une facon claire et constante.
Thought, just like sound, is an undifferentiated continuum, until
thought and sound, combined arbitrarily, coalesce to form a sign.
Le role characteristique de la langue vis a vis de la pensee
n'est pas de creer un moyen phonique materiel pour
l'expression des idees, mais de servir d'intermediaire entre la
pensee et le son, dans des conditions telles que leur union
aboutit ncessairement a des delimitations reciproques d'unites.
La pense , chaotique de sa nature, est forcde de se prciser
en se decomposant.1 0 4
thought
sound
Fig. 2 (Adapted from Saussure)
The units of language occur at the boundaries between these
continuums. Language, seen in this way, is form, not substance. It is
a system of relations. The system produced by these associations is not
determined by the sums of random pairs, but by the values these unstable
entities have relative to one another. The value of arbitrary signs
must necessarily depend on their places within a system. There are two
types of opposition which are the sources of a sign's value: relations
and equivalences. Thus, in a chain of elements, syntagmatic relations
will determine the value of units through their relations to one another,
while, independently of the sentence, words having something in common
are associated with words that can take their place. Take, for example,
the relations between a column and an archttrave. This juxtaposition of
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two elements present in space is analogous to syntagmatic relations,
while there are paradigmatic relations (equivalences) between several
types of columns. Thus, in language, a term's value in a sequence,
depends upon its relations with the terms that precede and follow it and
upon the relations between it and the other terms that might replace it.
These syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations can be seen at all levels
of linguistic analysis, whether the phonemic, the morphological, or the
syntactic.
La langue est pour ainsi dire un algebre qui n'aurait que des
termes complexes. Parmi les oppositions qu'elle comprend il y
en a qui sont plus significatives que d'autrs;mais unite et
fait de grammaire ne sont que des noms differents pour designer
des aspects divers du meme fait general: le jeu des
oppositions linguistiques.1 0 5
We find everywhere
A/
ce meme equilibre complexe de termes qui se conditionnent
reciproquement.106
Another critical distinction and one which sets Saussure apart
from his nineteenth century predecessors is his distinction between
synchronic and diachronic linguistics, which is also a consequence of
the arbitrariness of signs and their organization into a system. As we
have seen, the composition of linguistic signs, because it does not
correspond to a natural logic, is an important condition for allowing
continuous and random change. Indeed, at any particular time, the
actual forms of language are completely contingent on historical
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processes.* This contingency, however, does not affect the fact that
language is a system which, at any time, is determined by the
arrangement of its terms. The use of language depends upon the
understanding of these conventional and transient oppositions. Let us
return to the chess analogy. The state of the game can be considered
equivalent to a linguistic state at any given point. The value of the
pieces depends upon their opposition to all the other pieces in a
particular situation; furthermore, these relations will change from
move to move. However, in order to be able to understand any
particular position, it is not necessary to know by which one of the
many possible routes it was arrived at.107 So too with the relationship
of the synchronic condition of language to its diachronic "causes."
What is important for research is that the synchronic and the
diachronic should be separated because they concern facts and laws of a
completely different type. Synchronic laws, though general, are
essentially descriptions of a particular state; nothing guarantees that
they will persist. Diachronic laws do not reflect any one condition of
language; rather, they put forward the rationale that informs change
* Saussure is therefore very aware of the radically historical (and
social) nature of language. In the absence of any natural logic, social
consensus is the only valid criterion for the adequacy of any sign,
since their differentiation and organization as a system has no
external and natural requirements to correspond to. Societal use of
language is its only norm. The facts that a linguist describes have been
produced by a whole range of heterogenous and unpredictable causes, both
external and historical as well as internal and dependent on its own
potential for change.
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from one linguistic state to another, and in this (limited) sense,
are necessary and permanent, since change itself is an inherent part
of the arbitrary system.
Saussure argues against any synthesis of synchronic and
diachronic, again because of the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs.
Tant que par un des cotes un valeur a sa racine dans les
choses et leurs rapports naturels (comme c'est le cas dans la
science economique - par exemple un fond de terre vaut en
proportion de ce qu'il rapporte), on peut jusqu'a un certain
point suivre cette valeur dans le temps, tout en se souvenant
qu'a chaque moment elle depend d'un systeme de valeurs
contemporaine.108
The land itself, after all, has a natural basis for its value and
its variability is therefore much less limited.
A particular, synchronic condition of language is always brought
about by historical change; as a system of values, language is open to
continuous and arbitrary evolution. However, only the fact of linguistic
mutability is predetermined, and never the particular form that these
mutations take. Diachronic change is necessary, but only in the sense
that it must take place, not in the sense that it bears a functional
relationship to its synchronic consequences and predecessors.
In rejecting the primacy of biology in language, Saussure argues
that there is no reason to assume that our vocal apparatus should be
made for language in the way in which our legs are designed for walking.
On the other hand, he argues against Whitney, seeing language not as a
totally arbitrary social product, an institution like any other, which
109
only chose the vocal apparatus by accident. He sees the conventional/
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social aspects of language as being prior to the physical.110
If there is to be any overriding faculty it is not the articulatory
one, but the ability of "constituer une langue, c'est a dire un
systeme de signes distincts correspondants a des idees distinctes." 1 1 1
This faculty precedes the formation of any signs, and is a condition for
any language - indeed, for Saussure, of any sign system. This supports
his thesis that the manifestations of any particular sign system must
be basically social, since the biological faculties only define a
general potential to construct sign systems. However, this is a
potential which Saussure does not investigate at all, and there seems to
be very little acknowledgement that it might play even a limiting role
in sign systems, or in the behavior of language in particular.1 1 2
We can appreciate this if we examine Saussure's description of the
process of speech production and understanding. A concept produces an
acoustic image; this is a purely psychological phenomenon, followed by
a purely physiological process of transmitting an "appropriate impulse"
to the speech organs which produce sound. Part of this process is
"active" (that part of the circuit from the "centre d'association" of one
speaker to the ear of another) and part is "passive" (the reverse
hearing process). However, the process is not purely the uninterrupted
flow of concepts between passive minds, since:
Il faut ajouter une faculte d'association et de coordination
qui se manifeste des qu'il ne s'agit plus de signes isoles.
C'est cette faculte qui joue le plus grand role dans
l'organisation de la langue en tant que systeme.ll3
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The hearer however reverses the circuit. Saussure uses this
simple schema primarily to distinguish the psychological (verbal image
and concept) from the physical (speech and hearing).
But how are these systematic qualities achieved? How is it that
there is a language, and that there are any conventionally understood
signs? For Saussure, this can only be explained socially, since it
cannot be a function of either the psychic part of the circuit (which
is individual) or the physical part, which is unique to each instance,
and, on its own, clearly does not define language.
C'est par le fonctionement des facultes ree&ptives et
coordinatives que se forment, chez les sujets parlants
des enprentes qui arrivent a 9tre sensiblement les memes
pour tous.l14
Languel15 is the sum of all verbal images shared in all individuals.
It is complete in no one individual's mind. The relationship of langue
to parolell6 separates the social from the individual. Langue is not
determined by the speaker; he experiences its imposition passively. It
is parole that is individual, active and intelligent.
Langue is the socially determined aspect of the language faculty,
external to the individual, that he cannot change. Furthermore, the
individual must go through a learning process in order to understand its
workings. A parallel can be drawn here with Wittgenstein's brand of
conventionalism, in which, too, the meaning-carrying part of language is
not the individual's own repertoire, but its socially held and culturally
arbitrated portion. In sharp contrast to this, Chomsky maintains the
"verbal images" we use to link to meaning are located equally in mental
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structures held by each competent language-user.
It should be clear that the fact that language, for Saussure, is
in fact a sign system, despite the possibilities for confusion that
might exist given the potential undifferentiation of thought and sound,
depends on language being an entity which exists before the individual,
an entity determined by historical and social usage, almost the result
of an evolutionary process. (Indeed, it is a real material object -
the associations, collectively sanctioned, that make utp language are a
reality in the mind).
Saussure posits a further distinction: between the faculty of
language and language itself, the social institution. Language, as an
institution, is comparable with other social institutions, but very
different from them. It should be possible, argues Saussure, to develop
a science for the study of sign systems in their social context,
semiology, of which linguistics would form a part. Semiology, and
therefore presumably language, would be a part of psychology, and the
linguist's task should be to determine what makes "la langue un systeme
special dans l'ensemble des faits semiologiques." But the scientific
status of language depends ultimately on its position within a general
science of signs. "Le probleme linguistique est avant tout semiolo-
gique."ll8 The true nature of language will be revealed only when we
see it as a social sign system among others, whose individual
characteristics, while of primary importance for the researcher, are
again subsidiary to its semiological characteristics. Thus for Saussure
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...non seulement on eclairera le probleme linguistique, mais
nous pensons qu'en considerant les rites, les coutumes, etc...
comme des signes ses faits apparaitront sous un autre jour,
et on sentira le besoin de les regrouper dans la semiologie
et de les expliquer par les lois de cette science.ll 8a
The Saussurian position is often accused of being concerned
exclusively with surface structure, to the exclusion of deep structure,
and is also, by the same token, accused of being anti-theoretical.
Despite the undeniable progress that has been made since Saussure, and
not withstanding some of the definitive criticisms that have been made
of it, particularly by the Chomskyan school, it would seem that this
accusation is unjustified. It is worth noting that Saussure thought of
his work primarily as a necessary redefinition of linguistics,
theoretical classifications, and an inevitable preamble to scientific
progress in the field. There seems to be little doubt that in this he
was highly successful and that his contribution has been seminal in
this regard.
The tripartite distinction he sets up between linguistic faculty,
langue as a social manifestation, and parole, has been of lasting
importance, and it is worth focusing on its differences from the
Chomskyan model of competence and performance. Competence also is an
intersection of a particular cognitive faculty with environmental
conditions. But competence is much closer to the definition of
linguistic faculty. While Chomsky's cognitive faculty requires a
minimum of environmental stimuli to enable it to develop a competence in,
say, English, Chomsky's metaphysical and theoretical thrust is towards
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the characteristics of mind, of its cognitive faculties that allow
language. Those social aspects which for Saussure are of such basic
importance, which for Saussure, as well as for Wittgenstein, are so
necessary for communication, are demoted from competence/langue to
performance/parole/pragmatics. This is the result not only of a
localized, methodologically inspired shift in focus, but also of a
major, overall shift in theoretical orientation. For Saussure the
emphasis is on social practices and conventions and for Chomsky, on
inborn structures of mind.
As we have pointed out, the weakness of the Saussurian approach is
very well exemplified by its reliance solely on the transmission of the
conventions of language, in the same way that other social institutions
are. The major theoretical advance of transformational grammar is
the demonstration that this reliance on learning is quite inadequate to
explain many critical aspects of language, and by extension, of
knowledge; namely, that both are established on the basis of impoverished
environmental stimuli, and that both achieve remarkable consistency.
Language cannot simply be learned. Furthermore, critical aspects of
Saussure's theory of "value" in the system of langue, for Chomsky are a
part of a universal grammar (which parallels Saussure's "linguistic
faculty") and form a critical new dividing line between competence/per-
formance. In particular, syntagmatic relations, those aspects of value
that account for a sign's relations to other signs, are challenged by a
radically different, and novel, conception of syntax, which also
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radically alters the difficult relations of sentences to Saussure's
schema.
Saussure is critical of the idea that the only units of language
are sentences, from which one extracts words, and within which they
acquire their meaning, since for him sentences cannot be part of langue
since their individuality, appropriateness to context, etc., is their
prime characteristic, placing them in the realm of parole.
Entre les phrases c'est la diversite qui domine, et des qu'on
cherche ce qui les relie toutes a travers cette diversite on
retrouve.. le mot avec ses characteres grammaticaux.119
For Chomsky, "ce qui les relie" is syntax, and the laws of universal
grammar, biologically given by the mind, as we have seen. Indeed, it
is these deep aspects of language which characterize its individualness
(and furthermore tend to turn Chomsky away from any notion of a
semiological umbrella to provide an overall theoretical frame for all
kinds of communication). In particular, the notion of "structure
dependence" undermines the notion of syntagmatic relations as a basis
for value, since they are no longer part of a socially determined value
system. Indeed, it undermines the whole notion of "langue" in
Saussure's sense, by splitting it into two: a biological aspect, which
is a function of the language facility (language) and an individual
function, which is a component of performance.
This restricting of the field into innate/environmental has had an
undeniable effect in terms of its increased explanatory power, and the
production of new theories. But are we justified, even if we regard the
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Saussurian theoretical position as superseded, in rejecting it totally,
and in particular in rejecting it on the grounds of its inability to
deal with anything other than "surface" phenomena? Is there not a
great deal of value in the Saussurian insight that there is a (major)
aspect of language that does act like an institution, namely the uses,
associations, assumptions that seem largely to determine the
pragmatics and much of semantics, particularly where it deals with
meanings of words?
It seems to me that Saussure's unitary vision of language still
holds many lessons for us, in that it comes very close to the
understanding of language as a combination of both the innate and the
environmental, without assigning causal priority to either, and in that
it further emphasizes the systematic aspects of the socially acquired
components of language, which in this sense may be regarded as a social
artifact.
As we have seen, there are several important contrasts between the
attitudes of structuralists and those of cognitivists toward what
language is, and, therefore, toward what language should study - dif-
ferences which are, ultimately, symptomatic of differing ideological
orientations. For a structuralist, language is primarily a social
institution, a framework in its essential aspects, external to the
individual, which depends upon social relationships between individuals,
and which is a condition for them. It is a "treasure of the mind,"
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but is beyond the control of a single mind. This is langue: on this
definition, essentially a socially agreed upon network of relations.
More importantly, its basic units do not seem to include syntax or
sentences, or indeed, creativity (in the Chomskyan sense) at all.
These, for Saussure and for others, while being recognized as of huge
importance, are placed in the realm of parole. There is no doubt that
language's creativity, our ability to use it in new ways and in
unfamiliar and unforeseen circumstances, is difficult to explain, and
that the Saussurian notion of "analogy" as the mechanism for the
innovation and specificity of individual parole, remains unsatisfactory.
We can certainly argue that it is a "positive" problem shift for
generative grammar to have incorporated syntax into the domain of the
explanation of langue, and to have, at the same time, pursued the
Saussurian insight that language is primarily a psychological entity.
It is also important to recognize the axiomatic nature of the
generative grammarian's definition of language, a definition which makes
possible creativity by incorporating recursive rules into its deep
structure. Sentences are generated in a way in which different values
may be generated in an algebraic equation. As such, transformationalists
too are interested in structure, but structure of a creative sort, in
this limited sense, rather than the rather static, given entity of
Saussure's conception.
We should distinguish, however, when discussing "creativity" in
Chomskyan terms, between creativity in the sense of a formal recursive
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mechanism as against appropriateness of context, which cannot be
explained by any internal mechanism of this sort. This language-use
creativity is in the realm of a theory of performance. The capacity
for the former sort of creativity, essentially syntactic, is, however,
a precondition for the latter sort of creativity. The syntactic
faculty must be able to reproduce an infinite number of sentences to
correspond to the infinite number of ideas that man can produce.
Notice again that the existence of a creative faculty to allow for the
production of ideas does not in itself imply a Cartesian dualism. It
is quite possible that thought may merely be a property of a mechanism
with a level of complexity and organization equivalent to that which
we characterize as "mind." Perhaps this is closer to the Chomskyan
idea of "expressing ideas."
We can contrast this with Wittgenstein's1 2 0 view, which
consistently focuses on the social aspects of language use rather than
considering philosophical constructs such as "ideas," "inner processes,"
or "intentions." He is unwilling to go beyond the language-fact to any
mental process, indeed he finds such a leap both unnecessary, since we
can retrieve an adequate account of thinking, feeling, etc., purely
through our knowledge of the conventional use of these terms, and also
impossible - conceptually, we are too clearly trapped within our linguis-
tic skins. Language as a social institution reflects a form of life,
rather than any properties of mind, and language use grows out of
intersubjective behavior, rather than individual thought.
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In discussing linguistic competence Chomsky focuses on the
particular competence necessary for the use of language which is
particular to language alone, rather than on other "competences"
which the individual also acquires and which are no less essential
to the use of language. It seems clear that using language as one
normally does, within the range of situations which one normally
confronts, requires more than a mastery of syntax and semantics.
There seems to be no reason therefore to reject the Wittgensteinian
notion that to understand a language, one must be able to participate
in a whole "form of life," and therefore, to be aware of, to have
acquired and mastered, a great many social values, customs, and
conventions. (This in itself does certainly not falsify Chomsky's
approach; the fact that a language-competence interacts with other
competences does not preclude focusing on that aspect of those
competences which is most accessible and which is liable to prove the
most productive, and in particular, which is liable to lead the most
directly to an understanding of mental processes.) Naturally, how
linguistic competence interacts with others is an important problem,
and in particular, it would seem that it is only through these other
competences that we will be able to explain the production of appropriate
sentences in particular contexts. This, too, is Wittgenstein's point.
This observation, however, may lead us to ask how significant the
boundaries set up between competence and performance are; and, indeed,
to what extent the distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics
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can be sustained. It will also emphasize the fact that much of what
is classified as performance when it is strictly opposed to linguistic
competences consists itself of competences as well. To be more specific,
it seems clear that the influence of a specific linguistic context
cannot be ignored. Not only can it condition our understanding, but it
would seem to require a competence that cannot be reduced to the
competence that produces individual grammatical sentences. The concept
of text is clearly
a semantic concept and, even more exactly, a pragmatic
concept.121
However,
there is no reason to believe that the study of this function
does not belong to linguistics proper, especially if one
considers that it has direct influence on sentence structure
itself. 1 2 2
It seems clear that a competence for logical relations between
sentences is an important linguistic competence which should, perhaps,
not be relegated to performance.
The emphasis placed in the actual research of different linguists
on the internal or the contextual is a function primarily of their
metaphysical orientations, and there seems to be no reason at all why
they should not be largely compatible. While Chomsky's argument for
innate structures can remain uncontested, and while credit must be given
to his and others' attempts to propose theories that are as restrictive
as possible, and that have the greatest explanatory power, it is clear
that the emphasis on the innate is also the result of an important
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decision with historical and heuristic bases.
Nor is there any a priori argument for assigning priority to the
syntactic or semantic over the pragmatic. Assigning a priority to
competence over performance, emphasizing the innate over the social, may
also entail giving language a peculiar burden relative to thought:
that of being the vehicle for its expression. This tends to have two
related failings: First, language tends to be seen as a value-free
code, ignoring the fact that the means of expression is not independent
of the thought, that linguistic structure is not transparent. In
addition, emphasis on thought and its expression tends to locate the
most important aspects of language within the individual, neglecting
the actual facts of communication. Furthermore, it raises the spectre
of private languages, tending to neglect the fact that language's
communicative functions do not depend on having access to people's
inner processes, and hence language's function cannot primarily be the
expression of such processes. (That is, as Wittgenstein points out in
this context, a statement purporting to express an inner process will
make sense to us - qualify as "language" altogether - only to the extent
to which it appeals to, and participates in, a commonly-held language-
game.)
It could be said that the conception according to which the
essence of language consists of the expression of ideas, understood
in the sense of representations of the mind, has this time a
clearly Cartesian resonance, in the bad sense of the term.
1 2 3
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III
There is at the present time no 'unified' theory of meaning in
language: no theory that is capable of taking on the analysis of all
linguistic phenomena related to meaning whether syntactic, semantic,
or pragmatic - in other words, a theory of performance. Nor is there
any prospect of there being one. From a structuralist viewpoint, no
advance has been made toward a general theory of signs that could meet
these requirements.
In the absence of any unified empirical theory, it is my argument
that theories of meaning, in parallel with epistemological attitudes,
whether implicitly or explicitly held by practising architects as well
as by architectural theoreticians and historians, primarily reflect
their authors' ideological biases. It is my intention to demonstrate,
using the specific example of P. Eisenman, just what epistemological
and semantic consequences result from these metaphysical assumptions.
These attitudes will determine what position is taken concerning "the
profession," its independence, its own internal problems and issues,
and, most importantly, concerning the relations between "pure design"
and the social, cultural, and political context for design.
A very wide range of epistemological theories can be adopted,
reflecting an orientation on the status of knowledge, its acquisition
and its growth, and in particular they will reflect attitudes on the
nature of "architectural knowledge." Is it to be considered an
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independent set of rules with its own dynamics and procedures? Should
we speak of architecture as a set of timeless objects to be interpreted
according to predetermined logics of their own, or as a fundamentally
social phenomenon whose understanding (and whose production) must depend
on the context within which it is created, and on the complex levels of
legitimacy and association that characterize any socially determined
"game"? Can one speak of any historical continuity or geneology between
styles or is this an illusion that papers over totally different
attitudes and situations with an irrelevent chronology? Each of the
epistemological models we have analyzed could form the basis for both
historical and normative models in architecture. Thus we will distinguish
historians of pure "form" in architecture, those that go beyond the
descriptive and the chronological, between those who see continuity or
even progress from period to period, and those who will try to determine
the incommensurable characteristics of, say, the Gothic and the Baroque.
Those historians who acknowledge a historical context should also diverge
according to how they relate the internal, "architectural" to the
external, social, and according to the gradations they allow between
those two polarities.
Paralleling these epistemological viewpoints, we will expect to
find, implicit or explicit, theories of meaning, positioned within the
continuum of theories devoted to language, which will entail different
interpretations of a building and how it is said to "mean." At one end
of the scale, architects will be interested solely in form and its
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structure (and with the history of formal changes). At the other end
of the scale architecture will be considered as a cultural artifact
among many others, deriving its intelligibility from its position in
a cultural kaleidoscope of connections and associations..
Every architectural position, then, practical or theoretical, will
entail a position at each of these two levels - epistemology and
meaning. We will explore a particular architectural theory which makes
explicit use of language analogy as a key to understanding "meaning in
architecture," and show how this particular metaphysical orientation
determines the epistemological/semantic stance.
Peter Eisenman's theories of form and of the understanding of form,
of the inherent possibilities of physical arrangements to transmit
meaning, are of-particular interest since they reflect in an extreme,
but consistent fashion, many of the traditional positions in archi-
tectural criticism, and pursue them to an absurd and unworkable
conclusion. In particular, his very selective interpretation of the
Chomskyan model of linguistic syntax, and its transposition into a
theory of syntax and semantics in architecture, will reveal his under-
lying ideological orientation, which, I submit, is a fundamentally
idealist one. To be consistent with his metaphysics, his theory of
meaning is necessarily incapable of meeting the requirements for an
intelligible or productive theory of this type, and is certainly not
compatible with Chomsky's. Despite Eisenman's protestations to the
124
contrary, and despite his heralding of the new, post-functionalist
- 86 -
era in architectural thought and practice, his theoretical, and
therefore professional shortcomings rest on his inability to overcome
the inherent dualism that lies at the core of his philosophy. However,
the critical stance taken concerning Eisenman's theories should not
obscure the fact that he is a suggestive example of the necessity for
architectural theory to be located in an epistemological- and meaning-
space.
The theoretical orientation which has left the strongest mark on
the mainstream of modern architecture is the doctrine that "form
follows function." Form, the final physical artifact, was to be the
reification of the function of the building, as defined by a well-
defined list of requirements, a program. Architecture derived its
legitimacy, its social relevance, from the objective and rational
realization of the building's requirements in three dimensions. This
objectivity was to minimize the architect's idiosyncratic contribution,
making him a catalyst only, a convenient vehicle for this process. The
new architecture was to be value-free and rational, devoid of the
stylistic pastiche and eclecticism that characterized much of its
nineteenth century precursers.
It has been noted by many commentators that the modern movement was
not value-free in its design orientation. (It had a definite and
demonstrable interest in the aesthetics of buildings, both for their own
sake, and as a manifestation of the new technologies.); nor was the
program value-free, since it was definitely the result of very powerful
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ideals on the nature of the new society that architecture could help
bring about, a goal which the modern movement has been conspicuously
unsuccessful in realizing. Indeed, it would not be unfair to say that
the maxim "form follows function" defined very little, since it is
very unclear what was meant by "form," "follows," or "function."
As we have seen, the collapse of the inductivist orientation,
whether in epistemology or in language, has had very wide-ranging
repercussions, and could have resulted, with architects, in a vast
array of possible responses. Eisenman, characteristically, focuses his
attention on the internal, on the inherent logic of form. Noting,
correctly, that no statement of objectives will necessarily result in a
specific form, and noticing also that a program is necessarily a
statement of social values, Eisenman rejects functionalism as naive.
He also rejects the aesthetic agnostic, who acknowledging the satis-
faction of program as a goal, and seeing no necessary connection between
it and the final form, rejects any aesthetic consideration as totally
superfluous, since the program does not entail the aesthetic result.
Eisenman argues instead that:
The making of form can be seen as an understanding of the
logic inherent in any formal relationship, which can be
described in any physical construct.1 2 5
This position goes beyond functionalism or aesthetics since:
The making of form can be seen as a problem of logical
consistency, and the meaning which accrues to form may, in
some way, be derived from the logical interaction of formal
concepts.1 2 6
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Furthermore:
Form seen as a problem of logical consistency can mediate and
distinguish between problems of fact and problems of value:
that is, between that which is actual and that which is
implied.127
Eisenman begins his argument with Morris' distinction between
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, to which he assigns specific
architectural interpretations: Pragmatics is the concern with the
relationships of form to function, the use of technological means for
the solution of a program. Semantics is the relation of form to meaning,
which has traditionally come under the heading of iconography, the
study of symbolism, and the interaction of physical objects with the
cultural environment. Syntax, in architecture, corresponds to an
analysis of the potential of form itself to communicate:
the mediation of form and function through a structure of
formal relationships.128
In parallel with this taxonomy, Eisenman introduces the distinction
between the conceptual and the perceptual. His aim is to go beyond
"visual phenomena and their associated meanings" to more fundamental
"conceptual" understanding of form and object. 1 2 9 He notices both in
modern art, and, to some extent in modern architecture, a shift from a
primarily sensual approach to artifacts to a view that attempts to reduce
the meaning derived from an aesthetic experience or representational
image, and concentrates instead on transmitting meaning through the
inherent qualities of the object alone. However, this "destruction" of
as much as possible of the sensual has led conceptual art to overlook
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the fact that physical form can also be used for conceptual ends -
that is, "the universal aspects of physical form"129 have been
neglected.
Central also to the conceptual-art position is the notion of
aesthetic intention. The only thing that distinguishes an art object
is that the idea of the object embodies an aesthetic intention, an
intention which does not necessarily require any physical realization.130
This position in itself, though perhaps intriguing if one is
interested in the definition of art objects, does not exclude anything,
since it is perfectly possible to have an idea about anything. In this
trivial sense, then, the "intention to paint a picture or to design a
building could be considered conceptual." In order to bypass this dead-
end, Eisenman, noting the "the intention to paint a Madonna and child
does not make the idea of the painting, as opposed to the idea of
painting the painting, conceptual," distinguishes the intention to
produce an art object from "idea within the thing itself, i.e., its
conceptual structure." This conceptual structure is then defined as
'that aspect of visible form which is intentionally put in the form to
provide access to the inner form, or universal formal relationships."
Furthermore, "these formal relationships are present in every form [but]
may not be accessible... since they are undesigned."1 3 1
It is no coincidence that Eisenman adopts such a fragmented
interpretation of the terminology of linguistics. In particular, such
a restrictive definition of pragmatics, one that restricts it to a
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synonym for "practical," so that it can be dismissed (with inductivism
and functionalism) as superfluous, does violence to linguistic theory.
A concern with pragmatics is rather, in the study of language,- a concern
which makes explicit reference to language use, and to the influence
of the conditions of use on meaning. To remove the issue of "use,"
Eisenman has simply reduced the notion of pragmatics. Similarly,
Eisenman's definition of semantics is also revealing in view of the
distortion of Chomskyan theory and attitude it represents: His account
sees meaning as simply associated with "form." The explicit under-
standing, as we shall see, is that the process of understanding leads
in stages from form (syntax) to its intended associations (semantics).
The assumption here is that the "syntactic" is "deep" and important
whereas the semantic tends to be "surface," "social," and to be overcome.
This account bears little resemblance to Chomsky's view of the deep and
surface, of syntax and semantics; the general thrust of Chomsky's
approach is to use the general, formal, and abstract to build an
explanatory framework for the particular. In contrast, Eisenman
appropriates the abstract and formal primarily in order to render the
concrete and perceptual insignificant. He uses the terminology and
categories of transformational linguistics chiefly in order to provide
a vocabulary for his formalist bias which will grant it some theoretical
legitimacy. He has so impoverished these notions that his "linguistic"
system (unlike Chomsky's) is unable to function without the added notions
of expression and intent.
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The fundamental insight in Chomsky is that sentences can be
analyzed into abstract structures, and that these structures can
explain more about language and meaning than was possible before. There
is a continuous increase in explanatory power and empirical scope in
transformational grammar. This explanation focuses, ultimately, on the
mind. The aim of the transformational grammar approach is to provide a
theory that can account for the infinite variety and appropriateness of
language.
The abstraction process that Eisenman describes has no such
explanatory power. On the contrary, in conjunction with the notion of
intent, it necessarily excludes any. We have already criticized the
idea of intent as the basis for any theory of meaning - in the context
of architectural form, this notion precludes general explanation since
each architectural entity must be brought to the idiosyncratic court of
intent in order to be analyzed. It is clear that for an approach to
form to match the achievements of the Chomskyan approach to language,
it will have to determine ways in which form is structured by a
cognitive faculty in a cultural context. Abstract laws of form might
then be determined. This might, perhaps, be done through the analysis
of a particular corpus. In relying on intent Eisenman rejects both the
possibility of determining abstract laws of form-structuring and, by
the same token, the possibility of interpretation that an actual
architectural object might offer.
The appeal to obscure mental processes to avoid otherwise idiosyn-
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cratic interpretation denies language's essential mediating function
and sidesteps the crucial requirements of any successful theory by
remaining essentially anecdotal. Where Chomsky's theory expands the
scope of previous theory, Eisneman's cannot.
To return to Eisenman's theory of architecture, we next confront
the notion of the relationship of the conceptual to the physical
manifestation. "Physical reality itself has a conceptual aspect."1 3 2
However, it is not always the case that the object itself communicates
its conceptual and aesthetic intention. Eisenman uses the example of a
Duchamp urinal to illustrate an example of an object which can be
promoted to an art object through a change in context, through
changing a set of associations that are external to the object itself.
In this case, the aesthetic intention is communicated only through our
perception that it has nothing to do with the object itself, but is due
to an intentional shift in context.133
For Eisenman, the task of achieving a "conceptual architecture" must
necessarily be concerned with an exploitation of the qualities and
characteristics of physical, three-dimensional space, and, as we shall
see, this for Eisenman will necessarily depend on an understanding of
universal spatial parameters which will be context-free and culture-
independent. Clearly, the problem of "conceptualizing" a work will be
made more difficult by the day-to-day associations (semantic and
pragmatic associations, in Eisenman's terminology) of all standard
building elements: doors, windows, groundplane, entrance, external wall,
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etc.
There is no conceptual aspect of architecture which can be
thought of without the concept of pragmatic or functional
object, otherwise it is not an architectural conception.1 3 4
This does not, according to Eisenman, make the project of a
conceptual architecture infeasible, and he proposed that what is
required to make an architecture conceptual is to treat its traditional
elements so that they can be divorced from their original associations
and made into the neutral, value-free elements of an abstract
conception that goes beyond their pragmatic references and instead
communicates the architect's intent to construct an architectural
framework for which the elements and their relations will become
indices.
This intent is to be made manifest through the organization of the
object itself, and the problem of architectural design becomes a
problem of communicating this underlying "meaning" through the
particular internal organization of the form itself, without relying on
any external sign system. It is this structure which should have
the capacity to take the viewer from the sense (immediate)
perception to a conceptual attitude.
It will therefore
provide a means whereby conceptual relationships are conceivable
as independent of actual relationships.1 3 5
Eisenman proposes for the purposes of analyzing buildings and
distinguishing types of conceptual attitude from types of non-conceptual
attitude the traditional linguistic categories introduced above of
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pragmatics, semantics, and syntax, but modified and expanded so that
both semantic and syntactic meaning may be determined in two ways - deep
and surface. Eisenman wishes in this way to incorporate the purely
sensual aspects of the object itself since, for the original linguistic
taxonomy, this aspect of the written word is clearly irrelevant. At
the same time, he is distinguishing withint the "conceptual" class
conceptual meaning which makes reference to the physical from that which
does not. The following matrix illustrates the classification:
Conceptual
Perceptual
Syntactic Semantic
Fig. 3
136This taxonomy, artificial though it may be, is necessary to
sustain Eisenman's insistence on the internal, universal logic of form
as the basis for design. This is the hard-core of his position, and he
uses his taxonomic filter to distinguish among traditional semantic
137attitudes and concentrate on those whose primary intention is both
conceptual and syntactic. These operate at an abstract, deep level and
do not depend whatsoever on external associations and references or on
the participation in any set of social conventions for their under-
standing and appreciation.
As Chomsky points out, the linking of meaning with the word
is a surface phenomenon, and it is the syntax - or the
structure of the relationship between words - which is the
nature of the deep structure of the conceptual aspect.138
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Within the semantic realm can be distinguished an attitude which
uses direct literal reference to an already-known object to convey its
meaning, from one in which meaning depends on a process of juxtaposition
and comparison of known objects in the mind. Thus when Superstudio
tip their hats to Hannes Meyer's Marxism as it is translated in his
Palais des Nations building, it is done, according to Eisenman, through
a direct visual similarity between their buildings and Meyer's, and is
therefore primarily semantic, in a surface or perceptual sense, in its
intention. On the other hand, a Venturi building which is dependent on
the recognition of known historical, visual references, also depends for
its interpretation on the mental juxtaposition of these images placed in
the new context of Venturi's design. Thus Venturi's buildings are
primarily semantic also, but at a conceptual level, and Eisenman describes
Venturi's buildings as semantic in a "deep, abstract sense."
Again, within the syntactic realm, a realm that is concerned with
abstract relations, a distinction is made between a syntactic intention
that is deep/conceptual and one which is surface/perceptual. A surface
orientation is concerned with the "actual structure of the perceived
object."139 A conceptual orientation within the syntactic realm is
primarily concerned with relations between objects.
LeCorbusier, who also illustrates the semantic/conceptual attitude
in his work because he transposes images of known objects into a new
(conceptual) context and gives them a new meaning, demonstrates a
syntactic/perceptual dimension as well, since the "syntax" of his villa
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at Garches, for example (the ABABA rhythm of the column spacing) refers
not to the syntax of its Renaissance precedence (which would be semantic/
conceptual) but to the "Renaissance ideal" in general (hence syntactic/
perceptual). If LeCorbusier's intent had been to use an understanding
of the syntax of the Renaissance precedent (presumably its column
spacing) as a necessary element, to be compared with the syntax at
Garches if the new building's meaning were to be understood, the
implication is that this would have been more conceptual. However:
The syntactic dimension in LeCorbusier seems to be primarily
concerned with the surface aspect - with giving full scale 140
to the physical object so that it can be understood semantically.
The work of Terragni is seen, on this account, as embodying a mirror
intention, since, while Terragni's work has historical references,
particularly to certain Renaissance villas, this semantic reference is
not primary, since Terragni's intent is to divest his forms of their
traditional meaning and, instead, to use their "formal type as a deep
level syntactic referent to which his forms correspond." J The
relational aspect of his work is implied; it must be reconstructed within
the mind.
Within the realm where intent is primarily conceptual, a distinction
is drawn between the conceptual/semantic and the conceptual/syntactic.
Here Eisenman uses the comparison with the work of painters Jasper Johns
and Kenneth Noland, A conceptual orientation is one which is concerned
with relationships; but within this framework Eisenman distinguishes
relationships that derive their sense from the prior knowledge of the
- 97 -
elements combined from those whose meaning is transmitted through the
structure of form in the particular context - structure which is,
therefore, independent of any prior knowledge and independent of any
cultural reference. Thus, the concept of edge stress is used by both
painters but it is communicated differently. Johns produces it by
painting an American flag, a known image with well-understood
characteristics, in such a way that the edge of the flag is also the
edge of the canvas. This "stress" depends on the comparison in the mind
between the known quantity "flag" and the boundaries of the picture
plane. Noland's paintings, which consist of colored chevrons, produce
edge-stress through the particular structuring of form in relation to
the canvas, since his paintings do not involve known objects.1 4 2
Within the conceptual/syntactic realm, the most "abstract" of the
categories proposed, it is still necessary to distinguish two approaches
which define for Eisenman the nature of architectural syntax, which is
its "dual" character. This distinction resides in the way in which the
actual physical object is used to make clear the conceptual nature of
the work. On the one hand, a work may be purely notational; the physical
properties can be seen as a code standing directly for the "deep
structural" characteristics which are to be understood, and the form
itself as little more than a residual token. This is not the case with
the Noland chevrons, where both the conceptual and the perceptual
qualities of the object are used to communicate its aesthetic conceptual
intention - an intention which can only be reconstructed by the mind.
1 4 3
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Before we examine Eisenman's technique for achieving dual
syntactic structures in architecture, it is important to pause here to
assess Eisenman's taxonomy and the evidence which he uses to support
it. How meaningful is the "semantic/syntactic" distinction he draws
in describing or reconstructing the architect's original intent? Does
it serve any useful purpose at all in helping us understand how
buildings function irrespective of their authors' intent? Controversial
and badly understood as the methodological distinction is in
linguistics, where the goal is explicitly to focus on the nature of
innate mental structures as preconditions for language, is it even
intelligible when one is trying to lay down design criteria and when
one is interested in evaluating and interpreting people's reactions to
buildings?
Part of the answer to these questions is suggested by noting the
extreme opposition Eisenman sets up between semantics and syntax. No
longer the essentially complementary entities they are on the Chomskyan
model, they represent an exaggerated polarity. All abstract qualities
are subsumed under the syntactic heading; semantics is taken to meaning
everything perceptual. Abstraction, conceptualness is no longer seen as
the generalization of the particular and perceptual; instead, it is seen
as its opposition. This schema not only destroys the crucially
important insight of the Chomskyan position, that the conceptual is not
the independent opposite of the physical, but its mental correlate - we
perceive the physical because it corresponds to the mental. It also
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sets up a traditional dualism, lacking in Chomsky's theory, between
the mind and the body, the conceptual and the perceptual, the abstract
and the physical. In fact, this dualism approaches sheer idealism,
since what is taken as basic and "real" on Eisenman's account is the
mental and conceptual, and the physical thing is only an expression for,
an encoding, of the non-physical. The intricate correlation between
the mind and the physical world, the concept and the percept, has been
destroyed. The complexity in epistemology of the relationship between
the mental construct (theory) and the physical reality it describes is
similarly denied by this simple-minded assertion of the priority of
the conceptual.
An extensive analysis of the origins of the dichotomies Eisenman
sets up would be beyond the scope of this paper, but it is useful to
focus on the source of Eisenman's analysis of LeCorbusier, Colin Rowe's
article "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa," an article which shares
many of Eisenman's theoretical preconceptions. It begins with a highly
significant quotation from Sir Christopher Wren:
There are two cases of beauty - natural and customary.
Natural beauty is from geometry consisting in uniformity, that
is, quality and proportion. Customary beauty is begotten by
use, as familiarity breeds love of things not in themselves
lovely. Here lies great occasion for errors, but always the
test is natural or geometrical beauty.1 4 4
Rowe's article attempts to establish, through the comparison of the
villas of LeCorbusier and Palladio, that there was some actual historical
allusion intended in LeCorbusier's villas, and that these two architects'
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successes with their villas depends on their common mathematical
standards. The degree to which any connections between LeCorbusier
and Palladio is established is best demonstrated by the following
quote, which is not unrepresentative. Commenting on quotations from
each of the architects, where both describe their villas as sitting on
a hill and looking out in all directions on marvelous views of the
countryside, which evoke for LeCorbusier "un reve virgilien," he comments
on LeCorbusier's Savoye villa:
From the hygienically equipped boudoirs, pausing while
ascending ramps, the memory of the Georgics no doubt
interposes itself, and, perhaps, the historical reference
may even add a stimulus as the car pulls out for Paris.
(emphasis mine)145
As Rowe himself points out, "these are two buildings which, in their
forms and evocations, are superficially so entirely unlike that linking
them together would seem to be facetious."14 6
Indeed, in my opinion, the direct bridge is never successfully
made. The point of this digression, however, was not to point out the
inadequate factual support for Eisenman's acceptance of the assertion
that LeCorbusier's building refers primarily to a Renaissance ideal, or
to object to Rowe's intuitive standards of justification. It is to
point to a deeper set of underlying assumptions, the assumption that,
through commonly held, and by implication, universally true "mathematical"
abstract qualities, there may be a plane on which buildings apparently
unrelated historically, culturally, or formally, may be assessed and
contrasted: a plane on which the intrinsic formal properties of works
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of art can be recognized and appreciated. While Rowe is more literate
in his presentation and perhaps more frankly idealist in his attitudes
to design, Eisenman's insistence on the logic of form and its internal
universal characteristics has the same implications.
As we have pointed out, this is one reaction, of many possible ones,
to the failure of the inductivist ideology of form follows function
associated with the modern movement. But the recoiling at the attempt
at structuring society back into the traditional creative/artistic/
professional concerns of building, the rejection of inductivism for a
formalism loosely based on some kind of assumed cognitive or three-
dimensional universals, can only be predicated on a distorted view of
communication. To examine LeCorbusier's villa at Garches, and to reduce
it to column organization ("the ABABA structure") and to the "semantic"
reference to "the notion of a Renaissance ideal" is to guarantee an
inadequate understanding of the actual characteristics of buildings, and
the potential for use, irrespective of conscious design.
If the conceptual/perceptual taxonomy of syntactic and semantic
intent does not function very well, how does the linguistic analogy bear
up when contrasted with Chomsky's actual definition of syntax and
147
semantics within the framework of transformational grammar? Rules of
language, firstly, are defined as structure-dependent.
Structure dependence implies that grammar has rules that apply to
"phrase markers," that is, tree diagrams that decompose sentences into
abstract categories, through a process similar to parsing a sentence in
- 102 -
the classical sense.
148 ,sentence
For example, N y
T N verb ,I/N N
The Boy hit the Ball
Fig. 4
Such grammars are inherently more powerful than grammars which
try to describe, for example, language purely in terms of sequences of
words from left to right. Transformations map phrase markers into other
phrase markers. The phrase markers are initially generated by a base
that generates a set of "initial phrase markers." The base consists of
a "categorical component" and a lexicon. The categorical component
contains the rules for determining how the levels in the tree diagram
can be "rewritten" to form adjacent lower levels. (For example,
Sentence NP + VP would be such a rule) and also contains the lexical
categories themselves (articles (T) nouns (N) verbs (V), etc.) The
lexical component consists of lexical items that correspond to lexical
categories, and that are inserted through "lexical transformations."
Further transformations turn the abstract lexical items into the final
phonological sentence. Notice that these rules do not allow for any
guess-work. The final surface structure does not imply the deep
structure; it is determined by it by rules that every language unit must
interiorize.
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Initially, the deep structure of sentences were thought to
contain all the necessary information for transformations, as well as
the information required to determine the meaning of sentences.
However, while Chomsky argues that surface structure determines phonetic
form and grammatical relations in deep structure determine some elements
of meaning, it is also the case that surface structure has a role in
the determination of semantic interpretation. For example, the stress
in the following sentences determines to whom a pronoun refers:
"John washed the car; I was afraid someone else would do it."
"John washed the car; I was afraid someone else would do it." 149
The first sentence implies that I am glad that John washed the car;
the second sentence, that I am not. In the second sentence, "someone
else" refers to John, but not in the first. It seems that both deep and
surface structure contribute to meaning.
The rules that relate syntactic structure to meaning are not
at all well understood... It is not clear at all that it is
possible to distinguish sharply between the contribution of
grammar to the determination of meaning and the contribution
of the so-called 'pragmatic' considerations: questions of
fact, belief, and context of utterance.1 5 0
By contrast, this taxonomy of oppositions (conceptual/perceptual,
deep/surface, syntactic/semantic) in Eisenman's theory, even if we do
accept it as a positive step in our understanding of architectural
artifacts, does not in itself give any clue to the means for achieving
a "conceptual architecture." Indeed, it only hints at the transition
which Eisenman is hoping to achieve in the practice and theory of
- 104 -
architecture; namely, a shift from issues of "meaning," "value," and
"social legitimacy" to issues of "form," for its own internal
characteristics and logic. Crucial to this process is the ignoring of
any iconographic basis in favor of those formal structures of the
physical environment that condition iconographic interpretation and make
it possible.
Thus, Eisenman will reject the traditional issues of aesthetics,
and the traditional analysis of building as being concerned exclusively
with "surface" phenomena, even when they were dealing with some kinds
of relational issues. Issues of size, scale, texture, etc. are clearly
"surface" in Eisenman's taxonomy, but problems of the relations between
architectural elements (sequences of elements, their relative location)
are also surface phenomena even though they are syntactic (relational),
since they only provide information about a specific configuration.
They neglect the additional information which is latent in any
environment.1 5 1
This deeper level consists of abstract relations that can only be
inferred from specific environments, that can be understood, but that are
not actually manifest in the three dimensional shapes of the building.
Indeed, there is no direct relation between this "underlying structure
of relations" and the actual "shape" of the building.
Eisenman proposes two ways in which this type of (formal)
information may be made clear and these techniques form the basis of his
design strategy. Firstly, deep/conceptual information may be transmitted
- 105 -
by the viewer's ability to conceive physical elements as having been
shifted from some "prior condition." For example, the two planes of
Fig. 5 can be conceived as being "in a state of sheer displacement" if
we conceive of the prior conditions, illustrated by Fig.. 6 in our
minds.1 5 2
This prior condition is an original rectilinear configuration, and
a movement, relative to a set of pre-determined axes.
Naturally, the configuration in Fig. 5 can be described, but its
intended meaning can only be understood by juxtaposing the actual
perceived form with the prior conditions, in the mind. Only in this
way can the idea of "sheer" be conceived, as a "transformation" of the
prior conditions into the actual surface environment.
The meaning of this particular configuration is a function of the
formal regularities perceived in the actual environment and their
juxtaposition with a set of "deep structural regularities." The
information is therefore dependent both on the actual distribution of
elements, and on "the nature of our capacity to conceive of space and
form."1 5 3
It is this type of meaning that is sought after In House 1,
Eisenman describes the design process, which is also the decoding
process for the observer, as it dictates the different steps he must go
through:
First distinguish between those aspects of form which respond
to pragmatic and functional requirements and,,,reduce or
unload the existing meaning from the elements so that the
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forms may be seen as a series of primitive marks. Second
take these marks and structure them in an environment.
Third relate their structure to another structure of a more
abstract and fundamental nature so that the relationships
- provide a level of formal information previously
unavailable to the individual.15 4
The first step is applied by using the color of the- elements in a
non-traditional way (in a way which runs against the grain of the
stylistic vocabulary of the modern movement), and this becomes a marking
device. More importantly, the building is so designed that one cannot
see which beams, columns, etc. are structural and which are not. All
the elements which one would assume to be functional are not; and the
actual structural elements are not visible. Eisenman hopes by this to
remove the functional, "structural" associations of these elements.
This is achieved by a second step of organizing these neutralized
"marks" into a formal structure, It is important that this structure
be seen as the most important design issue in the environment, since it
acts as a preliminary stimulus to take the viewer from a primary interest
in the perceptual, and focus his attention on its formal organization
in which the intent (meaning) of the work is accessible.
Eisenman uses the columns and beams in two separate but overlapping
sets of formal structures: planes and volumes; relations of
155
frontality and sheer. The columns and beams mark both structures
(Fig, 7). There are two types of columns: rectangular ones which are
used in situations where implied planes cross, but are not read as
marking the plane, but as markers of a different kind (Fig. 8).156
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Furthermore, a second formal structure is created, an "implied
diagonal," by removing- beams and two columns from what would
otherwise be a continuous "layering."
But there is a further stage:
The system of formal relationships, whether marked or not,
in the actual environment, is usually considered the limit
of formal relationships in architecture. 1 5 7
This is a level of information which is the product of "formal
relationships interacting with another level of formal references."
We are here concerned with relations which are implied, between the
actual structure and the deep structure. The deep structure describes
Both a set of irreducible formal regularities as well as the
transformations of these regularities into a specific
environment. 1 5 8
The transformations consist of such things as sheer, compression,
rotation. Together the "deep" structures and their transformations of
a given environment can add a new dimension to the information contained
by any environment, provided of course that the environment can
"mark," in some way, the deep structure and its transformations.
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Conclusion
Eisenman's position is open to considerable internal criticism
of the sort I have suggested because his account simply does not sustain
the theoretical foundations he has claimed for it. As I.argued above,
his appropriation of linguistic categories does violence to these
concepts; similarly, his account of meaning, claiming to rest on notions
of "deep structure," "transformational rules," and the like, again
distorts these notions beyond recognition. The causes of these
distortions are again clearly a function of Eisenman's formalist
ideological orientation. Internal criticism was not, however, the
only aim of this analysis.
The aim was also to show that architectural theories necessarily
imply position in epistemology and in the theory of meaning. Eisenman's
attitudes commit him to a "naive" epistemological idealism and his
biases entail a theory of meaning which combines the worst of
dualistically-oriented abstractionism with the traditional view of
'art as intent."
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